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STEVEN W. BENDER*
Oregon Consumer Protection:
Outfitting Private Attorneys
General for the Lean Years
Ahead
D ESPITE decades of legislative and judicial effort to eradi-j cate unfair and deceptive trade practices, they continue to
thrive in Oregon's consumer marketplace. The legal response to
such practices has resulted in a struggle to honor the equally im-
portant, but sometimes conflicting, goals of encouraging legiti-
mate consumer claims and safeguarding "honest business[es]
acting in good faith"1 from abusive litigation. Thus far, the bal-
ance has tilted toward merchants and has denied consumers un-
checked private weapons against market unfairness and
deception.
Traditionally, marketplace misdeeds prompted common law
fraud actions.2 Recently, the unconscionability doctrine has
joined fraud in the common law's consumer protection arsenal.3
In practice, however, these common law doctrines have proved
inadequate to make exploited consumers whole; fraud poses a
* B.S., University of Oregon, 1982; J.D., University of Oregon School of Law,
1985. The author would like to thank Patricia Ferrell-French, Phil Goldsmith,
Maury Holland, Laird Kirkpatrick, and Jim Mooney for their comments on earlier
drafts, and Caroline Gerloch for her research assistance. My research was also sup-
ported by a summer research grant from the University of Oregon School of Law.
The views expressed in this Article are those of the author, not necessarily those of
the Oregon Consumer Advisory Council, of which the author is a member.
1 William A. Lovett, State Deceptive Trade Practice Legislation, 46 TUL. L. REv.
724, 744 (1972) (footnote omitted).
2 See generally DEE PRIDGEN, CONSUMER PROTEcMON AND THE LAW ch. 2
(1994).
3 See generally Steven W. Bender, Rate Regulation at the Crossroads of Usury and
Unconscionability: The Case for Regulating Abusive Commercial and Consumer In-
terest Rates Under the Unconscionability Standard, 31 Hous. L. REv. 721,735 (1994)
(discussing the historical development of unconscionability).
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rigorous gauntlet of proof4 which many consumers are unable to
run, and unconscionability provides inadequate remedies.- As a
result, consumer complaints are often unredressed, and abuses
undeterred.
Legislative action against merchant overreaching began in
1938 when Congress amended the Federal Trade Commission
Act (FTCA) to prohibit "unfair or deceptive acts or practices" in
interstate commerce.6 However; the FTCA did not create a pri-
vate cause of action;7 it only empowered the Federal Trade Com-
mission (FTC) to obtain relief.8 By the late 1960s, the height of
the consumer movement, the FTC was urging the states to join in
its battle against consumer abuse by enacting state counterparts
to the FTCA.9 At the same time, the FTC urged the states to
complement public enforcement with a private cause of action
for wronged consumers.10
The states responded with a rush of legislation. During the
4 See PRIDGEN, supra note 2, § 2.02, at 2-4.
5 Cf. Bender, supra note 3, at 757-60 (discussing the inadequacies of the remedies
for unconscionable conduct under Section 2-302 of the Uniform Commercial Code,
which has been construed to grant the same narrow equitable remedies as when
equity courts applied the doctrine).
6 See generally J.R. Franke & D.A. Ballam, New Applications of Consumer Pro-
tection Law: Judicial Activism or Legislative Directive?, 32 SANTA CLARA L. Rev.
347 (1992); Marshall A. Leafier & Michael H. Lipson, Consumer Actions Against
Unfair or Deceptive Acts or Practices: The Private Uses of Federal Trade Commis-
sion Jurisprudence, 48 GEo. WASH. L. Rev. 521, 524-31 (1980). Some specialized
federal and state consumer regulation predated the FTCA amendment. For exam-
ple, several states had enacted so-called "printer's ink" statutes criminalizing false
advertising. In the early 1900s, food and drug regulation was enacted by both Con-
gress and a few states. See Lovett, supra note 1, at 728.
7 Without significant exception, federal courts have rebuffed consumer litigants'
efforts to fashion a private action under the FTCA. E.g., Holloway v. Bristol-Myers
Corp., 485 F.2d 986 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (class action sought to challenge alleged decep-
tive advertising of pain reliever); Carlson v. Coca-Cola Co., 483 F.2d 279 (9th Cir.
1973) (dismissing class action which only alleged FTCA violations). One federal
district court did allow aggrieved consumers a private action to enforce a cease and
desist order issued by the FTC against conduct the FTC had declared unlawful.
Guernsey v. Rich Plan of the Midwest, 408 F. Supp. 582 (N.D. Ind. 1976). Congress
has since rejected efforts to provide a private action under the FTCA. See Leafier &
Upson, supra note 6, at 524 n.17. Moreover, the Guernsey result is an anomaly not
followed in other jurisdictions. Id. at n.16; see also PRIDGEN, supra note 2, § 12.09,
at 12-80 to 12-84.
8 Since 1975, the FICA has authorized the FTC, in certain circumstances, to seek
restitution and other equitable remedies on behalf of consumers. 15 U.S.C. § 57b-
l(b) (1988).
9 See Franke & Ballam, supra note 6, at 355-58; Leafier & Lipson, supra note 6,
at 521-22.10 See Franke & Ballam, supra note 6, at 357.
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1960s and 1970s,11 all fifty states and the District of Columbia
enacted statutes12  addressing deceptive market practices.
Although some of these statutes as initially enacted did not pro-
vide for private actions, all but two states (Arkansas and Iowa)
now expressly or impliedly authorize private enforcement to aug-
ment public enforcement by state agencies. 13
Oregon's statutory response to market deception began in
1965 with the prohibition of certain specified "deceptive trade
practices."14 Enforcement was vested exclusively in the state's
district attorneys,1 -5 but the efforts of their "understaffed or indif-
ferent"1" offices prompted one commentator to label Oregon the
"weak link in the west coast [enforcement] chain."17 The 1971
Unlawful Trade Practices Act (UTPA) bolstered enforcement in
Oregon by vesting concurrent public enforcement authority in
the state Attorney General18 and by authorizing private
enforcement.19
11 In 1957, New York and Rhode Island were the first states to regulate deceptive
practices. They were joined in 1961 by Washington and Alaska, and thereafter by
the remaining states. See Lovett, supra note 1, at 729 n.13.
12 The two most comprehensive guides to these statutes are Professor Pridgen's
treatise, supra note 2, and the National Consumer Law Center's practice manual,
Unfair and Deceptive Acts and Practices by Jonathan Sheldon and Carolyn L. Carter
(3d ed. 1991).13 See PRIDGEN, supra note 2, § 6.02, at 6-4 to 6-8; SHELDON & CARTER, supra
note 12, § 7.2, at 375-78. North Dakota, the most recent state to adopt a private
action, did so in 1991. N.D. CEr. CODE § 51-15-09 (Supp. 1993). The states' adop-
tion of private rights of action in the 1960s and 1970s has effectively mooted the
effort to secure a private remedy under the FTCA. PRIDGEN, supra note 2,
§ 12.0915], at 12-84.
14 Act of May 24, 1965, ch. 490, 1965 Or. Laws 952. For a comprehensive discus-
sion of the history of Oregon's deceptive practice legislation from 1965 through its
1973 amendment, see Ralph James Mooney, The Attorney General As Counsel for
the Consumer: The Oregon Experience, 54 OR. L. REV. 117 (1975).
15 Act of May 24, 1965, ch. 490, § 4, 1965 Or. Laws 952, 953.
16 Mooney, supra note 14, at 119.
17 Sherry Smith, Comment, The Consumer Fraud Information Gap, 49 OR. L.
REV. 421, 433 (1970).
18 See Mooney, supra note 14, at 118-27.
19 OR. REV. STAT. § 646.638 (1993). Oregon's adoption of private enforcement
was consistent with the urgings of national scholars. Professor Lovett articulated the
classic argument for such private actions as:
The availability of private consumer actions for deceptive trade practices
and the consequent improved bargaining power for consumerswould have
the ... effect of greatly assisting and complementing the task of law en-
forcement for state attorneys general and their consumer protection staffs.
State officials cannot possibly investigate or prosecute every single claim of
deceptive acts or practices; they must inevitably concentrate their work on
the most blatant and frequent offenders .... But in a great many areas it is
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This UTPA private cause of action has effectively displaced
common law fraud as the remedy of choice for deceptive prac-
tices. UTPA claimants need prove only the specified statutory
elements of their claims rather than the more rigorous elements
of fraud.20 The UTPA claimant's burden of proof is also less
than that of the fraud plaintiff.21 Finally, UTPA remedies are an
improvement over those available under the common law; claim-
ants can recover minimum damages of $200 on proof of any "as-
certainable loss" 22 and are likely to be awarded reasonable
attorneys' fees. 3
Oregon's statutory enhancement of common law fraud briefly
captured the attention of students, academics, and practition-
ers. 2 4 But, by the 1980s, the consumer movement had stalled and
the consumer.., who can most cheaply and quickly remedy [the con-
sumer's] injustices ....
Lovett, supra note 1, at 749; see also Mooney, supra note 14, at 128 n.61 ("All
commentators agree that a private right of suit is an essential component of any
worthwhile system of consumer fraud redress.").
Some commentators have argued further that private enforcement of deceptive
practices legislation is inherently superior to public enforcement. E.g., PRIDGEN,
supra note 2, § 6.02, at 6-4 (Private actions are "less subject to politicization than a
government enforcement approach."); Arthur Best, Controlling False Advertising.
A Comparative Study of Public Regulation, Industry Self-Policing, and Private Liti-
gation, 20 GA. L. REv. 1, 4 (1985) (Private enforcement is "faster" and its "substan-
tive outcomes reflect public concerns."); Leaffer & Lipson, supra note 6, at 555
("Effective private enforcement ... offers the best deterrent against wrongdoing in
the marketplace.").
2 0 See Richard A. Slottee, Oregon Unlawful Trade Practices Act, in CONSUMER
RiGrrs AND REMEDIES § 5.1 (Oregon State Bar 1983 & Supp. 1988). For example,
unlike fraud, the plaintiff in a UTPA action may not have to show reliance on the
representation, depending on the requirements of the particular statutory deception
alleged to have been committed. See Sanders v. Francis, 277 Or. 593, 598, 561 P.2d
1003, 1006 (1977) (necessity of reliance as an element of causation depends on par-
ticular unlawful practice alleged). In addition, although the common law required
the fraudulent statement to be made directly to the claimant or with intent that it be
transmitted to the claimant, the Oregon Court of Appeals found no such require-
ment in the UTPA. See Raudebaugh v. Action Pest Control, Inc., 59 Or. App. 166,
650 P.2d 1006 (1982) (action by home buyers on false pest and fungus report ob-
tained by sellers).
21 Proof of fraud under the UTPA must satisfy the preponderance of the evidence
standard rather than the more rigorous common law standard of clear and convinc-
ing proof. State ex rel. Redden v. Discount Fabrics, Inc., 289 Or. 375, 615 P.2d 1034
(1980).
22 OR. REV. STAT. § 646.638(1); see also discussion infra part III.B.
23 OR. REv. STAT. § 646.638(3); see also discussion infra part III.D. In contrast,
common law fraud claimants generally cannot recover their attorneys' fees. See Jeff
Sovern, Private Actions Under the Deceptive Trade Practices Acts: Reconsidering the
FTC Act as Rule Model, 52 OHIO ST. L. 437, 440 (1991).
24 For commentary on Oregon's UTPA, see Slottee, supra note 20;, J. Britton Con-
[Vol. 73, 19941
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the spotlight was off the UTPA. Now, however, two factors com-
pel reexamination of the UTPA's private action: consumer fraud
is on the increase and the Measure 5 property tax limitation,
threatens to erode the state's ability to fight it.
Since the adoption of the UTPA in 1971, Oregon consumer
complaints have grown more than tenfold. In 1972, the Attorney
General received 2440 complaints. 6 The number reached nearly
5000 per year from 1974-76.27 From October 1993 to October
1994, the number of written complaints was 7841 while telephone
complaints soared to over 2000 per month.'8
In the face of this explosion of complaints, government en-
forcement resources are in crisis. The FTC reserves its scarce
resources for flagrant nationwide deception.29 In Oregon, where
state and local government share UTPA enforcement authority,
every district attorney's office has eliminated its consumer pro-
tection division in response to funding reductions. 30 Public en-
roy, Comment, The Private Remedy Under Oregon's Unlawful Trade Practices Act,
56 OR. L. REv. 490 (1977); Mooney, supra note 14; Jean R. Uranga, Idaho and
Oregon Consumer Protection Acts: Administrative Powers of the Attorneys General,
13 WILLAMETTE L.J. 455 (1977).
7 5 OR. CONST. art. XI, § 11b (adopted by public initiative Nov. 6, 1990). Measure
5 imposes separate property tax limitations for funding Oregon's public school sys-
tem and for other government operations. The limit imposed for other government
operations ($10 per each $1000 of assessed value) has been in effect since the 1991-
92 fiscal year.2 6 Conroy, supra note 24, at 492 n.18.
2 7 Id. (4730 complaints in 1974, 4736 complaints in 1975, and 4699 complaints in
1976).
28 Letter from Peter D. Shepherd, Attorney in Charge of Financial Fraud Section,
Oregon Department of Justice, to Steven W. Bender (Nov. 30, 1994) (on file with
the author) [hereinafter DOJ letter] (reporting that the DOJ received 25,626 tele-
phone complaints during the same time period). This astounding figure reflects only
those consumers who employed the Attorney General's "consumer hotline" - a
toll-call except in Salem and Portland and available only four hours a day. A recent
national study by the ABA concluded that only 29% of low-income households
sought legal help to resolve their various legal problems such as consumer credit and
insurance abuses. See Mark Hansen, A Shunned Justice System, A.B.A. J., Apr.
1994, at 18. As such, the number of consumers with trade practice complaints is
likely much greater than the statistics from the "hotline" reflect.29 See Leaffer & Lipson, supra note 6, at 554 (noting the scarce budgetary re-
sources of the FTC); Sovern, supra note 23, at 442 (observing that the 1990 FTC
budget of less than 55 million dollars was "obviously a small sum for regulating the
many transactions and businesses within the FTC's purview").
30 From 1965 to 1971, district attorneys had exclusive authority to enforce Ore-
gon's deceptive practice regulation. By 1977, only Lane County retained a con-
sumer protection division in its district attorney office. See Conroy, supra note 24,
at 500 n.65. Lane County has since eliminated its consumer protection division,
thereby completing the demise of enforcement of the UTPA by district attorneys.
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forcement of the UTPA now falls solely on the Department of
Justice (DOJ), a state agency feeling the pinch of Measure 5. In
1975, when the state had only three attorneys, six investigators,
and three secretaries to enforce the UTPA, Professor Mooney
suggested that these resources were inadequate.31 Today, despite
the dramatic swell of consumer complaints, the DOJ's UTPA en-
forcement section32 is staffed by three more attorneys, two fewer
investigators, and overall only two more personnel.33 Increases
in enforcement staff and resources are not forthcoming; the
UTPA enforcement section receives 11% of its budget from Ore-
gon's General Fund, a source of funding facing a 20% across-the-
board cut in 1995. 31
In the 1990s, the combined pressures of increasing consumer
abuse and budget reductions are placing more enforcement re-
sponsibility on consumer litigants and the private bar. Oregon's
statutory private cause of action, however, leaves consumers ill-
equipped to meet this new challenge. Despite the huge number
of consumer complaints each year, few private UTPA actions are
initiated. In 1975, for example, consumers lodged 4736 com-
plaints with the DOJ, but filed only 128 private actions.35 From
October 1993 to October 1994, there were 25,626 telephone com-
plaints but only 163 private lawsuits.36 Some of these complaints
were remedied by the DOJ or settled out of court by the con-
sumer.37  The vast majority, however, probably went un-
31 See Mooney, supra note 14, at 131.
32 The Financial Fraud Section of the DOJ Civil Enforcement Division enforces
the UTPA.
33 DOJ Letter, supra note 28 (reporting that 1994 staffing consists of 5.75 FTE
attorneys, 4 investigators, 3 "consumer enforcement officers," and 1 "consumer edu-
cation coordinator").
34 Wrought by Measure 5, the 1995-97 Oregon budget shortfall was predicted to
be approximately $1.15 billion. See Brent Walth, Candidates Find Budget Issues
Won't Go Away, REGISTER GUARD, Apr. 24, 1994, at C1. More recently, the budget
shortfall has been forecast at $847 million. Eric Mortenson, Forecast: A Speedy Ses-
sion, REGISTER GUARD, Nov. 21, 1994, at Al.
35 Conroy, supra note 24, at 492 n.18, 517.
36 DOJ Letter, supra note 28 (also reporting that 138 private lawsuits had been
filed in the first 7 months of 1994). The statistics for the 1993-94 UTPA actions are
derived from the number of complaints received by the Attorney General pursuant
to the notification procedure in OR. REv. STAT. § 646.638(2).
37 Some of the complaints may also have resulted in small claims court proceed-
ings. The Attorney General would not be notified of these proceedings because
most consumers in small claims court do not plead their claims under the UTPA.
See infra note 178. It is also possible that a few complaints were resolved through
arbitration. See infra part III.H. for a discussion of arbitration of UTPA claims.
[Vol. 73, 19941
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redressed, in large part, because attorneys are often unwilling to
pursue otherwise valid small-dollar consumer claims. 38
Unless reforms are adopted to strengthen Oregon's private ac-
tion, the decline in public enforcement resources will combine
with the inadequacy of the current private remedy to make Ore-
gon a favored destination for vagabond purveyors of fraud and
deception.39 The state will once again be the "weak link in the
west coast chain" of consumer protection.' This Article exam-
ines Oregon's UTPA with an eye toward legislative and judicial
reforms that will strengthen its private cause of action and
thereby facilitate private enforcement. First, the scope of the
UTPA is examined. Next, private remedies authorized by the
UTPA are critiqued. Finally, the role of the DOJ is reformulated
in response to declining public resources and increased reliance
on private enforcement.
I
OREGON UTPA SCOPE REFORMS
A. Removing the Rulemaking Condition From the Deceptive
Practices "Catchall"
The Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law pro-
posed in 1970 by the FTC and the Council of State Governments
(the 1970 UTPCPL) offered states three alternative means of de-
fining deceptive practices.41 The first two prohibited deceptive
38 Cf. Letter from Edward J. Benett, attorney in Portland, Or., to Steven W.
Bender (Mar. 25, 1994) (on file with the author) ("Personal injury attorneys fall all
over each other for work - soliciting clients from hospital and police records and
advertising on television - while referring away consumer cases .. ").
39 Cf. Leafier & Lipson, supra note 6, at 554 ("[Ihe best solution to the serious
limitations on public enforcement of unfair trade practices law is the expansion of
private enforcement under state UDAP [unfair and deceptive acts and practices]
statutes.").40 See Smith, supra note 17, at 433. Oregon consumer lawyers and the Attorney
General agree on the need to encourage private enforcement. One Oregon attorney
opines that inducing the private sector to enforce the UTPA is consistent with "the
public mood" that supported Measure 5: "[tlaxpayers don't want additional govern-
ment agencies .... but taxpayers are not opposed to forcing... perpetrators to pay
for private attorney general regulation." Letter from John J. Cosgrave, attorney in
Portland, Or., to Steven W. Bender (Apr. 13, 1994) (on file with the author).
Testimony submitted to a House subcommittee in 1993 expressed the commitment
of the Attorney General to "exploring new ways to allow individuals to shoulder the
ever increasing work load placed on government." Hearings on H.B. 2386 Before
the House Judiciary Comm. Subcomm. on Civil Law and Judicial Administration,
67th Sess. (Feb. 2, 1993)(statement of Timothy Wood, Assistant Attorney General.)41 See generally Anthony P. Dunbar, Comment, Consumer Protection: The Practi-
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practices generally, while the third incorporated both a list of the
twelve practices outlawed by the 1966 Uniform Deceptive Trade
Practices Act (the 1966 UDTPA)42 and a catchall for "engaging
in any act or practice which is unfair or deceptive to the
consumer."
43
Oregon adopted the third alternative, but without its expan-
sive "catchall." 44 Instead, Oregon's catchall was a narrower pro-
hibition of "any other conduct which similarly creates a
likelihood of confusion."'45 Moreover, no private action was au-
thorized under the Oregon catchall unless the Attorney General
had already issued a rule declaring the particular conduct to be
confusing.' Neither the 1966 UDTPA nor the 1970 UTPCPL
had suggested that states so restrict their catchall. In 1973, Ore-
gon replaced its narrow catchall with broader language: "any
other unfair or deceptive conduct in trade or commerce."'47 Un-
cal Effectiveness of State Deceptive Trade Practices Legislation, 59 TUL. L. REv. 427
(1984).
42 Proposed by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws, the UDTPA is found at 7A U.L.A. 265 (1966).
43 See Council of State Governments, Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Pro-
tection Law, in 1970 SUoESTED STATE LEGISLATION 141 (1969) [hereinafter SUG-
GESTED STATE LEGISLATION].
44 See Mooney, supra note 14, at 122. For a discussion of the scope of Oregon's
1965 deceptive practices legislation and the 1967 amendments thereto, see id. at 118-
19. This legislation was replaced entirely by the UTPA in 1971.
Oregon commentators attribute the UTPA to the 1970 UTPCPL. E.g., id. at 119.
Most commentators elsewhere, however, categorize Oregon as having adopted the
1966 UDTPA. E.g., SHELDON & CARTER, supra note 12, § 3.4.1.2.3, at 96 n.120;
Dunbar, supra note 41, at 429 n.16; David B. Lee, Note, The Colorado Consumer
Protection Act: Panacea or Pandora's Box?, 70 DENv. U. L. REv. 141, 143 n.12
(1992); Donna S. Shapiro, Note, The Georgia Fair Business Practices Act: Business
as Usual, 9 GA. ST. U. L. Rnv. 453, 455 n.18 (1993). The UDTPA lists Oregon as
among eight states that have adopted the 1966 Act and is likely the source of na-
tional commentators' misinformation. See UNw. DECEFFIvE TRADE PRAMCES
Acr, 7A U.L.A. 265 (1966). Though Oregon did employ the third scope alternative
of the 1970 UTPCPL which was borrowed from the 1966 UDTPA, Oregon's defini-
tions and public and private remedies provisions follow those of the 1970 UTPCPL.
Oregon is thus correctly classified as a 1970 UTPCPL jurisdiction.
45 Act of July 2, 1971, ch. 744, § 7(1)(r), 1971 Or. Laws 2003,2007. This was based
on the twelfth practice enumerated in the 1966 UDTPA which reads, "any other
conduct which similarly creates a likelihood of confusion or of misunderstanding."
7A U.L.A. 280 (1966) (emphasis added). Although the third alternative of the 1970
UTPCPL recommended this wording, Oregon left off the last three words.
46 Act of July 2, 1971, ch. 744, § 7(4), 1971 Or. Laws 2003, 2007.
47 Act of July 6, 1973, ch. 235, § 2(1)(r), 1973 Or. Laws 401, 403. This language
employs the broader catchall from the third alternative to the 1970 UTPCPL which
Oregon had refused to adopt two years earlier.
[Vol. 73, 1994]
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changed since then," the scope of Oregon's catchall is still de-
pendent on Attorney General rulemaking.49
In 1975, Professor Mooney blamed Oregon's reliance on
rulemaking for rendering its new catchall "meaningless;" at that
time, the Attorney General had adopted only one rule.50 The
Attorney General's rulemaking record has since improved,51 but
the legislature has added more specific violations to the UTPA
by amendment than the Attorney General has by rule.52 The At-
torney General's passive approach to rulemaking has forced the
legislature to play catch-up every two years to keep pace with
new schemes of consumer fraud. Because Measure 5 may im-
pede more active rulemaking, the UTPA must be amended to
eliminate the rulemaking condition. Oregon courts should be
free to dispense consumer justice under the catchall regardless of
whether a particular kind of misconduct has been sufficiently
egregious or prevalent to prompt rulemaking.
Some merchants may argue that fleshing out the catchall on a
case-by-case basis will not provide honest businesses with suffi-
cient notice of what conduct will be considered unfair or decep-
tive.53 This objection can easily be overcome.
First, in other jurisdictions almost all conduct held to be ac-
tionable within an "unfair or deceptive" catchall was already ac-
tionable under the common law or was in violation of some other
statute.' Thus, the "unfair surprise" these merchants fear is not
48 See OR. REv. STAT. § 646.608(1)(u) (1993).
49 See OR. REv. STAT. § 646.608(4) (1993). A majority of other states broadly
prohibit all "unfair or deceptive" practices without the restrictive condition of prior
administrative rulemaking. See PRIDGEN, supra note 2, § 3.02[2](c], at 3-6 to 3-7.
Seven states adopting the 1970 UTPCPL did omit the "unfair or deceptive" catchall.
Id. at 3-7 & n.9.50 Mooney, supra note 14, at 123 & n.30 (an anti-tying restriction issued as a tem-
porary rule during the 1974 gasoline shortage).
51 Since 1975, over a dozen permanent and temporary rules have been promul-
gated. See OR. ADMIN. R. ch. 137, div. 20 (1993).
5 2 See OR. REv. STAT. § 646.608(1)(r)-(t), (v)-(nn) (1993).
53 Professor Mooney reported that the 1965 Oregon legislature had so concluded
when it adopted Oregon's first consumer fraud protection. See Mooney, supra note
14, at 160 n.153.
54 For example, a repair shop committed an "unfair" practice by vandalizing the
aircraft of a customer who disputed the repair bill. State v. Grogan, 628 P.2d 570
(Alaska 1981). Its conduct would be actionable by the aggrieved consumer under
various common law tort theories. Another example is an Oregon case in which an
auto repair shop allegedly misrepresented both the repair price and the extent of
repairs it would perform. See Denson v. Ron Tonkin Gran Tbrismo, Inc., 297 Or. 85,
566 P.2d 1177 (1977). The court held these allegations did not implicate the two
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OREGON LAW REVIEW
that practices previously thought legitimate will be declared im-
proper. Rather, their fear stems primarily from the availability
of UTPA remedies stronger than those available under the com-
mon law55 and the possibility of private enforcement which other
statutes may deny.56
Second, a catchall freed from the rulemaking condition need
not be standardless. 57 Over half the states look to the federal
standard of unfairness and deception for help in construing their
catchalls.5" The "venerable history of interpretation and defini-
tion by the Federal courts" 59 of the federal standard provides suf-
ficient notice to honest merchants as to what conduct is
unacceptable in the marketplace. Oregon's elimination of the
rulemaking condition should thus be coupled with express adop-
tion of the federal standard as a guide to interpreting the UTPA
catchall.
In adopting the federal standard as a guide to interpretation,
the legislature must resolve two questions: first, which of the sev-
eral sources of federal law should Oregon courts look to, and
provisions of the UTPA pleaded by the plaintiff - § 646.608(1)(g) (false representa-
tions of standard, quality, or grade) and (1)(j) (price reduction representations). Id.
These representations should have been actionable as common law fraud or at least
as a breach of contract. It is unclear why the plaintiff did not plead the statute's
more general prohibition of false statements concerning "the nature of the transac-
tion or obligation incurred." OR. REV. STAT. § 646.608(1)(k).
55 For example, unconscionable contract terms have been held "unfair or decep-
tive." E.g., Kugler v. Romain, 279 A.2d 640 (N.J. 1971). Unlike relief available
under most state deceptive practice statutes, remedies for common law unconsciona-
bility typically do not include restitutionary recovery or attorneys' fees. For a dis-
cussion of the similar shortcomings of unconscionability remedies under Section 2-
302 of the UCC, see Bender, supra note 3, at 757-60.
56 For example, the FFC Used Car Rule requires the auto dealer to place a win-
dow sticker on each used car to indicate, among other things, the existence of any
warranty. The sticker must be given in Spanish when the sale is conducted in that
language. 16 C.F.R. § 455.5 (1993). There is no private action, however, for FTCA
violations or rules promulgated thereunder. See supra note 7. Courts, however,
should treat a violation of the Used Car Rule as actionable under a state's "unfair or
deceptive" catchall. See generally SHELDON & CARTER, supra note 12, § 5.4.3.1, at
220-22, § 3.2.4.3, at 86-89. Oregon's Attorney General has been considering for over
a year whether to make a dealer's failure to disclose in Spanish actionable under the
Oregon catchall. Oregon consumers in the meantime have no private means to en-
force that FTC Rule obligation.
57 For example, courts have uniformly rejected constitutional challenges to decep-
tive trade practice catchalls as overbroad and vague. E.g., Scott v. Association for
Childbirth at Home, Int'l, 430 N.E.2d 1012 (11. 1981).58 See Jack E. Karns, State Regulation of Deceptive Trade Practices Under "Little
FTC Acts". Should Federal Standards Control?, 94 DCK. L. REV. 373, 379 (1990).
59 Scott, 430 N.E.2d at 1018.
[Vol. 73, 19941
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second, what degree of deference should the courts give federal
law? Federal guidance can be derived from several distinct
sources.6° For instance, several years ago the FTC announced
standards of "unfairness"61 and "deception" 62 for purposes of the
FTCA. In deferring to the federal standard, Oregon could look
to the standards of the FTC, the federal courts, or both. As to
the degree of deference to be accorded the federal source cho-
sen, some states authorize mere "consideration" or "guidance" 63
while others call for giving "great weight" to the federal stan-
dard.6 Oregon should invoke the "venerable history" of the fed-
eral standard, but it should not bind its courts by requiring them
to give "great weight" to such analogous interpretations. 65 In-
stead, courts should, in their own discretion, "consider" any one
or more of the potential federal sources for "guidance."
Even after the abolition of the rulemaking condition, the At-
torney General should be allowed to give additional, but not ex-
clusive, content to the catchall through rulemaking. Attorney
General rulemaking would best serve consumers not as a gate-
keeper to the UTPA catchall but instead as a facilitator to help
consumers prove "unfair or deceptive" practices under the catch-
60 Other state statutes refer variously to FTC interpretations, FTC rulemaking,
and FTCA jurisprudence in general. See Lee, supra note 44, at 150 n.61.
61 See PRIDGEN, supra note 2, § 3.04[1], at 3-28.5 to 3-30 (describing the FTC's
standard as focusing solely on substantial consumer injury); SHELDON & CARTER,
supra note 12, § 4.3.2, at 129-30. Congress codified the FTC standard of unfairness
in its 1994 reauthorization of the FTC. See Federal Trade Commission Act Amend-
ments of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-312, § 9 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 45(n)).
62 See Shapiro, supra note 44, at 457-58. These FTC standards have been read to
be narrower than those of then existing federal case law interpreting the Act.
63 E.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 19.86.920 (1989).
64 E.g., IDAHO CODE § 48-604 (1977). The 1970 UTPCPL had suggested states
give "due consideration and great weight" to the interpretations of the FTC and the
federal courts under the FTCA. See SUGGESTED STATE LEGISLATION, supra note
43, at 141, 147. The 1970 UTPCPL intended that federal authorities would thus
provide the substantive content to consumer protection and that state authorities
would enforce that content. See Franke & Ballam, supra note 6, at 357.
65 See Elizabeth A. Dalberth, Comment, Unfair and Deceptive Acts and Practices
in Real Estate Transactions: The Duty to Disclose Off-Site Environmental Hazards,
97 DicK. L. REV. 153, 161 (1992) ("If the FTC and the federal court rulings are given
'great weight and due consideration,' the state courts may be limited in interpreting
the state UDAP statute. Conversely, if the state courts are only 'guided' ... it shows
the legislative intent to provide for flexibility in interpretation... .") (footnote omit-
ted); see also Leaffer & Lipson, supra note 6, at 533-34 n.82. Senate Bill 224 being
considered by the 1995 Oregon legislature would abolish the rulemaking condition
and direct that courts be "guided" by the federal standard when construing the
UTPA.
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all. More than half of the states authorize a state agency to adopt
regulations to construe their deceptive trade statutes.66
Although some states defer to these regulations only as guides,
most give the regulations effect as per se violations.' Oregon
should adopt the latter approach. Accordingly, the combined
policymaking of Congress, the FTC, the federal courts, the Ore-
gon Attorney General, and the Oregon courts will determine
what constitutes actionable misconduct under the UTPA catchall.
B. The Need for a Private Remedy Under the UTPA for
Unconscionable Trade Practices
Courts in other states have held unconscionable conduct ac-
tionable under unfair and deceptive practice catchalls.61 Claim-
ants in Oregon, however, cannot expect this liberal construction
because specific legislative intent denies a UTPA private remedy
for unconscionable conduct.69 Oregon's 1977 prohibition against
"unconscionable tactics" was added to the UTPA as ORS
646.607, but this section does not trigger the UTPA's private
remedy.70 The result is that only the Attorney General can chal-
lenge unconscionable tactics under the UTPA. Regardless of
whether Oregon reforms its catchall, Oregon should amend the
UTPA to provide a statutory private remedy for
unconscionability.
Redressing unconscionable conduct under the UTPA would
improve on the common law which denies recovery of affirma-
tive damages for unconscionability.71 For example, the purchaser
of excessively priced goods who has already paid the excessive
price is denied restitution. State deceptive trade practice reme-
66 See SHELDON & CARTER, supra note 12, § 3.2.3, at 84-86.
67 Id.
68 See, e.g., Murphy v. McNamara, 416 A.2d 170 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1979) (exces-
sively priced television rent-to-own transaction); Kugler v. Romain, 279 A.2d 640
(N.J. 1971) (excessively priced educational books violate "deceptive" practices
catchall). See generally SHELDON & CARTER, supra note 12, § 4.4.1, at 136-37. A
few states expressly reference unconscionable conduct in their state deceptive prac-
tice act. In 1990, Idaho joined these states. See IDAHO CODE § 48-603C (Supp.
1994).
69 Of course, the existing rulemaking condition would also prevent Oregon claim-
ants from seeking judicial interpretation and expansion of the catchall.
70 See OR. REV. STAT. § 646.638(1) (private action for any method, act, or prac-
tice declared unlawful by § 646.608 only).
71 E.g., Best v. United States Nat'l Bank, 780 Or. App. 1, 714 P.2d 1049 (1986)
(action for recovery of alleged excessive NSF charges), affd on other grounds, 303
Or. 557, 739 P.2d 554 (1987).
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dies, however, make both restitution72 and attorneys' fees avail-
able to victims of unconscionability. 7  Oregon's Attorney
General can seek restitution on behalf of consumer victims of
unconscionable tactics,74 but it is unrealistic to rely on the un-
derfunded government to seek such relief. The current increase
in unconscionable practices 75 will leave consumers without a
UTPA remedy unless they are allowed to assert their rights in a
private action when the Attorney General is unable to pursue
their claims.
Despite these compelling arguments for a private UTPA rem-
edy for unconscionable trade practices, unconscionability has
been a tough sell to Oregon's legislature. Examples of Oregon's
mistrust of the doctrine abound. In 1977, Oregon derived its def-
inition of "unconscionable tactics" from the Uniform Consumer
Sales Practices Act (the Uniform Act), 76 but did not adopt the
Uniform Act's private remedy for unconscionability. The legisla-
ture also omitted the Uniform Act's reference to grossly exces-
sive price as a relevant factor in determining unconscionability.77
It may have feared the result if it authorized Oregon courts to
72 E.g., Fleet v. United States Consumer Council, Inc. (In re Fleet), 95 B.R. 319
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1989) (New Jersey unfair practices statute entitled consumers of
grossly overpriced lawyer referral service to refund); Wernly v. Anapol (In re
Wernly), 91 B.R. 702 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988) (returning excessive check cashing
charges under Pennsylvania's unfair practices regulation).
7 3 E.g., UNuI. CoNsuMR SALES PRACTICES Acr § 11(e), 7A U.L.A. 255 (1971).
7 4 See OR. REV. STAT. § 646.636 (1993).
75 For example, the Oregon State Public Interest Research Group announced in
March, 1994, its findings of the abusive cost of Oregon rent-to-own transactions. See
Julie Tipp, Rent-to-Own Spurs Campaign, OREGONIAN, Mar. 3, 1994, at Fl. In
1993, Oregon passed disclosure legislation to regulate the rent-to-own industry,
making violations an unfair practice actionable by consumers. See OR. REv. STAT.
§ 646.608(1)(LL) (1993). Urged by the rent-to-own industry, this mild legislation
did not address abuses in the actual price charged.
Abuse of Hispanic consumers by some Oregon automobile dealers has prompted
the Attorney General to consider rulemaking to declare as an unfair practice dealer
exploitation of consumers' inability to understand contracts in English. Such
rulemaking, however, might be inconsistent with the legislative intent to deny con-
sumers a UTPA private remedy for unconscionability. The solution to avoid that
challenge is to amend the UTPA to make any unconscionable tactic in the market-
place actionable in a private action.
76 See UNIF. CONSUMER SALES PRACTCES ACT § 4, 7A U.L.A. 241 (1971).
77 d. at § 4(c)(2) (referring to a price that "grossly exceeded the price at which
similar property or services were readily obtainable in similar transactions by like
consumers"). Oregon's definition of "unconscionable tactics" borrows from the
Uniform Act those factors in subsections 4(c)(1), (3), and (4), but not those in (c)(2)
(gross price), (c)(5) (excessively one-sided transaction), and (c)(6) (misleading opin-
ions). See OR. REV. STAT. § 646.605(9) (1993).
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regulate prices; courts in other states, however, have shown re-
straint in striking down excessive prices as unconscionable.7' In
proscribing "unconscionable tactics," Oregon also rejected the
Uniform Act's "knew or had reason to know" standard in favor
of the more lenient standard of "knowingly" taking advantage of
the consumer.79 Finally, instead of using the Uniform Act's pro-
hibition of an unconscionable "act or practice," Oregon's UTPA
refers to an unconscionable "tactic. " '° This language arguably
implicates only procedural unfairness in the bargaining process
to the exclusion of the "substantive" unfairness of one-sided con-
tract terms.
Oregon's less than warm welcome of the unconscionability
standard into the UTPA is mirrored by its refusal to adopt the
remedial enhancements to common law unconscionability in Ar-
ticle 2A of the Uniform Commercial Code. Oregon's adoption
of that Article omits the UCC allowance of "appropriate relief"'
and attorneys' fees' to successful consumer lessees. The legisla-
ture may thus be reluctant to reform the UTPA to allow a private
remedy for unconscionability that would give the Oregon con-
sumer those same remedies for leases of goods and the other
consumer transactions subject to the UTPA. Nevertheless, be-
cause compelling reasons for this reform make its potential for
adoption more than academic, this Article examines in later sec-
tions the impact of providing a UTPA private remedy for uncon-
scionability on such existing private action conditions as
ascertainable loss83 and willfulness," as well as the prospect of
78 See generally Bender, supra note 3, at 756 n.178 (observing that successful
claims of price unconscionability typically involve a price disparity in excess of 2/1
over the market price or other measure of fairness employed). Moreover, since Ore-
gon no longer imposes fixed usury limits on most transactions, there is a compelling
need to make unfair pricing actionable under the UTPA. See generally Richard A.
Slottee, Interest and Usury, in CONSUMER RrHTs AND REMEDIES ch. 4 (Oregon
State Bar 1983).
79 Compare UNIF. CONSUMER SALES PRAcncES AcT § 4(c), 7A U.L.A. 241
(1971) with OR. REv. STAT. § 646.605(9)(a) (1993) ("[k]nowingly takes advantage of
a customer's physical infirmity, ignorance") and § 646.605(9)(b) (1993)
("[k]nowingly permits a customer to enter into a transaction... [without] material
benefit").
80 OR. REV. STAT. §§ 646.605(9), .607(1) (1993).
81 U.C.C. § 2A-108 (1990). The UCC drafters presumably intended by that refer-
ence to give courts authority to grant restitutionary relief.
82 See OR. REV. STAT. § 72A.1080 (1993). A few other states also omitted the
UCC remedial enhancements for unconscionability claims. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 680.1081 (West Supp. 1994).
83 See infra part II.B.
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recovering punitive damages under the UTPA.8 5
In summary, the legislature should reform the UTPA's treat-
ment of unconscionability in the following manner: (1) the pro-
hibition of unconscionable tactics in § 646.607(1) should be
moved into the "laundry list" of violations in § 646.608 so as to
trigger the UTPA private remedy,6 (2) references to an uncon-
scionable "tactic" should be changed to an unconscionable
"method, act, or practice,"'  (3) the definition of unconscionabil-
ity in § 646.605(9) should be amended to include the Uniform
Act's reference to grossly excessive pricing, thereby eliminating
the implication that such conduct is not actionable under the
UTPA, 8 and (4) the definition of unconscionability should be
amended to delete any reference to "knowingly," so that uncon-
scionable conduct will be treated as any other unfair or deceptive
conduct for which the consumer need only prove the lesser
UTPA standard of willfulness.8 9
C. Other UTPA Scope Reforms
Although unrelated to the need to shift the enforcement bur-
den from the DOJ to private litigants, other reforms to the scope
84 See infra part II.C.
85 See infra note 196 and accompanying text.
8 Senate Bill 224 introduced in the 1995 Oregon legislature aims to accomplish
the same result by referencing § 646.607 in the UTPA private remedy statute.
One issue typically overlooked when states add unconscionability to their decep-
tive practice statute is the tradition in common law and UCC 2-302 that unconscio-
nability is decided by the judge, not the jury. In 1981, one commentator argued
persuasively against legislatures' fear of letting juries decide that issue. See Donald
R. Price, The Conscience of Judge and Jury: Statutory Unconscionability as a Mixed
Question of Law and Fact, 54 TEMP. L.Q. 743 (1981) (questioning how that issue
differs from such amorphous issues as negligence which are routinely entrusted to
juries). Because states have with few exceptions codified unconscionabifity as a
question of law for the court (e.g., UNIF. CONSUMER SALES PRAcrCES Acr § 4(b),
7A U.L.A. 241 (1971)), and because Oregon has historically distrusted unconsciona-
bility, it should be made subject to the UTPA private remedy with the statutory
caveat that the issue is one for the court.
87 The latter phrasing is derived from § 646.638(1) which provides a private rem-
edy for "a method, act or practice declared unlawful by ORS 646.608." Idaho's new
unconscionability statute also uses this phrasing. See IDAHO CODE § 48-603C
(Supp. 1994).
88 See supra text accompanying note 77. For a discussion advocating a net profit
comparison standard in the place of the Uniform Act's market standard, see Bender,
supra note 3, at 754-57. For a discussion of courts employing deceptive practice
statutes to redress excessive pricing, see generally PRIDGEN, supra note 2, § 3.04[21,
at 3-42 to 3-46.
89 See infra part II.C. (discussing the UTPA willfulness requirement).
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of the UTPA should be considered the next time the legislature
examines the UTPA. 90 Areas in need of review include the ap-
plication of the UTPA to professionals, the judicial exclusion of
loans of money, and the statutory exclusion of landlord
misconduct.
1. UTPA Application to Professionals
Professionals such as doctors and lawyers are not expressly or
impliedly excluded from the UTPA.91 The Oregon Court of Ap-
peals has confirmed this in holding that dentists are subject to the
UTPA even though dentistry is "closely regulated" by the Board
of Dental Examiners.92 Lawyers too are apparently liable under
the UTPA.93 Removing the rulemaking condition from Oregon's
9 0 One commentator has urged states to reform their deceptive practice statutes
to protect small business plaintiffs. See Note, Toward Greater Equality in Business
Transactions: A Proposal to Extend the Little FTC Acts to Small Businesses, 96
HARV. L. REV. 1621 (1983) [hereinafter Toward Greater Equality] (arguing small
businesses are typically as unsophisticated as consumers and usually lack the finan-
cial resources to litigate disputes effectively). The UTPA governs business transac-
tions if they involve "franchises, distributorships and other similar business
opportunities." OR. REV. STAT. § 646.605(7) (1993); see also OR. REV. STAT.
§ 650.020 (1993) (private action for deception in sale of franchise); cf. Goodyear
Tire & Rubber Co. v. Thalatin Tire & Auto, Inc., 129 Or. App. 206, 879 P.2d 193
(1994) (UTPA permits private action by one corporation against another for covered
business transaction). It may be reasonable to extend the UTPA to protect small
business plaintiffs generally if they can demonstrate significant abuses exist in the
marketplace that cannot practically be pursued under the common law or the ex-
isting UTPA coverage of business opportunity transactions. In any such reform, the
legislature should adopt a realistic definition of those small businesses to be pro-
tected. The Texas deceptive practice statute protects any business with assets under
$25 million. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.45(4) (West 1987). The Texas ap-
proach is overbroad if it intends to protect the unsophisticated and financially neces-
sitous small business.
91 Some states do expressly exempt professionals from their deceptive practice
statutes. See PRIDGEN, supra note 2, § 4.05[3], at 4-60. Some states have construed
their legislation to exclude professionals as not engaged in "trade or commerce" or
on other grounds. Id.
92 Investigators, Inc. v. Harvey, 53 Or. App. 586, 633 P.2d 6 (1981); see also State
v. Freeman, 131 Or. App. 336, 345, 884 P.2d 878, 883 (1994) (the UTPA applies to
chiropractors and other health professionals when they commit a violation "in the
course of providing professional services"). This result is consistent with the FTC's
position that the legal and other state-regulated professions are not exempt from the
FTCA. See Franke & Ballam, supra note 6, at 374.
93 Cf. Porter v. Hill, 314 Or. 86, 94, 838 P.2d 45, 50 (1992) (including dictum that
§ 646.608(k) and (s) would apply to a lawyer who filed an action to collect fees not
in fact owed); Roach v. Mead, 301 Or. 383, 392, 722 P.2d 1229, 1234 (1986) (plaintiff
had no UTPA claim when unable to prove whether legal services concerning invest-
ment were obtained for the requisite consumer purpose).
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catchall94 might subject lawyers and doctors to UTPA remedies
for their legal or medical malpractice if it were held an "unfair"
practice. Although the refusal by Oregon courts to compensate
personal injury claims under the UTPA 95 would keep the flood-
gates closed for medical malpractice claims, lawyers might not be
so fortunate. Perhaps the best solution would be to borrow the
approach employed by the Washington courts and apply the
UTPA to claims relating to attorneys' entrepreneurial activities
such as advertising and billing but not to claims relating to legal
competence.96
2. UTPA Application to Loans of Money
Oregon courts construe the UTPA restrictively to exclude
loans of money from its scope because the money lent is not a
"good" and lending is not a "service." 97 Nationally, most courts
have construed the same statutory language to encompass loan
transactions.9 One court observed that "[o]nly an artificially
94 See discussion supra part I.A.
95 See infra note 141 and accompanying text.
9 6 See Haberman v. Washington Pub. Power Supply Sys., 744 P.2d 1032 (Wash.
1987), amended by 750 P.2d 254 (Wash.), appeal dismissed, 488 U.S. 805 (1988). The
Oregon legislature or courts might further distinguish between fraud in legal compe-
tence and pure negligence without any misrepresentation, excluding only the latter
from the UTPA.
9 7 See Lamm v. Amfac Mortgage Corp., 44 Or. App. 203, 605 P.2d 730 (1980)
(alleged misrepresentation by lender not actionable under UTPA which does not
apply to "loans or extensions of credit"); Haeger v. Johnson, 25 Or. App. 131, 548
P.2d 532 (1976). Certain loan transactions or lender conduct may nonetheless be
governed by the UTPA. Sellers of real estate, goods or services who finance their
own sales transactions should be subject to the UTPA. See Slottee, supra note 78,
§ 5.5, at 5-4. The provision of services by a lender apart from the lending of money
might be actionable under the UTPA. Cf. Roach v. Mead, 76 Or. App. 83, 88 n.5,
709 P.2d 246, 249 n.5 (1985) ("We do not consider the issue of a person who ...
open[s] a checking or other account. Such accounts normally involve the purchase
of various financial services for personal use, and the [application of the UTPA]...
may therefore be different [than for loans of money]."), aff'd, 301 Or. 383, 722 P.2d
1229 (1986). Finally, a lender's misconduct in collecting its loan is actionable under
Oregon's unlawful debt collection statutes. OR. REV. STAT. H8 646.639-.643 (1993).
Though not discussed in the UTPA cases involving loans of money, § 646.639(1)(b)
defines a consumer transaction for purposes of debt collection to involve a person
who "sells, leases or provides property, services or credit to consumers." (emphasis
added). In specifically referring to "credit" when it enacted the debt collection stat-
utes in 1977, the legislature was apparently aware of the 1976 Haeger decision under
the UTPA, but did not amend the UTPA to include a similar reference.
98 See cases cited in SHELDON & CARTER, supra note 12, § 2.2.1.2, at 43 n.93. But
see Barber v. National Bank, 815 P.2d 857 (Alaska 1991) (loan is not a good or
service).
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narrow construction would hold that the [deceptive trade] statute
applies broadly to practices utilized to effect a sale, but cannot
reach the practices utilized in its financing." 99 This rationale is
compelling; state deceptive practice legislation, as a rule, should
encompass all consumer transactions unless the common law
provides adequate remedies for a particular type of transaction
or other state or federal regulation sufficiently "occupies the
field" to deter and remedy deceptive practices. Neither is the
case for loans of money.
Common law remedies for unconscionability and fraud perpe-
trated by lenders do not provide sufficient monetary incentive to
encourage enforcement by consumers or their attorneys1 °° The
more difficult question is whether existing regulation of loans
"occupies the field" and therefore preempts UTPA coverage. In
1977, the DOJ abandoned its attempt to amend the UTPA to
include loans of money because it determined the Banking Com-
missioner had jurisdiction over lending institutions.101 Despite
this determination, unfair and deceptive practices in lending are
not comprehensively regulated by other law and should be made
99 Garland v. Mobil Oil Corp., 340 F. Supp. 1095, 1099 (N.D. Ill. 1972).
100 See supra notes 2-5, 20-23 and accompanying text. Lenders need not fear un-
fair expansion of "lender liability" if the UTPA scope is expanded to encompass
credit as that result would generally not create new standards of liability for lenders.
Rather, remedies for the existing common law obligations to avoid unfairness (un-
conscionability) and deception (fraud) would be fortified.
101 See Lamm, 44 Or. App. at 205, 605 P.2d at 731. The lender in Haeger argued
federal and state regulation of lenders preempts application of the UTPA to lenders.
25 Or. App. at 134-35, 548 P.2d at 534. Because the court concluded that the UTPA
did not apply to loans, it avoided the preemption issue. Id. at 135, 548 P.2d at 534-
35.
Insurance was expressly excluded from the UTPA presumably because unfair in-
surance practices were already regulated by Oregon's Department of Commerce
(now the Department of Insurance and Finance). OR. REv. STAT. §§ 646.605(7),
746.005-.991 (1993). Oregon's regulation of insurance fixes a private remedy for
specific unfair or deceptive insurance practices, such as an insurer's mandate that a
claimant engage a particular vehicle repair shop, § 746.300, but not for deception or
unfairness generally. One commentator observed that the potential for misrepre-
sentation in insurance is great and that states should therefore exempt insurance
from the state's deceptive practice act only if "the regulatory tradition and practice
of its insurance commissioners reflect a vigorous representation of consumer inter-
ests." Lovett, supra note 1, at 734. Congress has exempted the insurance industry
from the FTCA, see PRIDGEN, supra note 2, § 8.05[2], at 8-19 to 8-20, and the impact
of Measure 5 on state agencies may place the burden of deterring deceptive insur-
ance practices on common law remedies ill-suited for that purpose. If insurance
abuses reported to the Department of Insurance or the DOJ increase in frequency,
Oregon should amend its separate regulation of insurance practices to provide a
comprehensive private remedy based on that of the UTPA.
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subject to the UTPA. For example, there is no private cause of
action under Oregon's regulation of the unfair practices of con-
sumer finance licensees."° The Federal Truth in Lending Act
imposes technical loan disclosure requirements but neither pro-
hibits nor remedies deceptive practices generally." 3 Though the
FTC and other federal agencies regulate most lenders in some
way, the same is true for other businesses governed by the
UTPA. Moreover, Oregon courts have applied the UTPA to
professions (such as dentistry and law) that are already subject to
separate intense state regulation.1" For these reasons, Oregon
should amend its UTPA definition of "real estate, goods or serv-
ices" in section 646.605(7) to expressly include credit obtained
for consumer purposes.
3. UTPA Application to Residential Tenancies
The UTPA excludes "conduct covered by" Oregon's Residen-
tial Landlord and Tenant Act (the ORLTA). 1°5 The propriety of
this exemption depends on the sufficiency of other Oregon reme-
dies for unfair and deceptive landlord practices. The ORLTA
regulates some but not all such practices. For example, it pro-
vides a private remedy for unconscionable rental agreements"°
102 See Series v. Beneficial Oregon, Inc., 91 Or. App. 697, 756 P.2d 1266 (1988)
(no private action for violations of an Oregon statute that prohibits false statements
by consumer finance licensees). Oregon's new regulation of mortgage bankers and
mortgage brokers, OR. Rev. STAT. §§ 59.840-.960 (1993), does create a private ac-
tion to redress any fraudulent conduct engaged in by these businesses. See OR.
REv. STAT. § 59.925. This new regulation covers some transactions already covered
by the UTPA; for example, transactions involving a mortgage broker paid for her
services in locating a willing lender. On the other hand, it also covers some transac-
tions heretofore excluded from the UTPA, such as a home equity loan from a mort-
gage banker. Reform of the UTPA to reach loan transactions generally is still
necessary, however, because this new regulation applies only to realty loan transac-
tions and excludes many types of lenders from its scope. See OR. REv. STAT.
§ 59.840(4), (6) (definitions of "mortgage banker" and "mortgage broker").
103 Cf. State v. Brotherhood Bank & Trust Co., 649 P.2d 419 (Kan. Ct. App. 1982)
(Tuth in Lending does not preempt the application of the Kansas deceptive trade
practice statute). Oregon's Attorney General has promulgated a regulation making
violations of Truth in Lending a UTPA violation when related to the purchase of
real estate, goods, or services. OR. ADmiN. R. § 137-20-040 (1993).
104 See supra part I.C.1.
105 See OR. REv. STAT. § 646.605(7) (1993). This exclusion was added in 1977,
Act of June 15, 1977, ch. 195, 1977 Or. Laws 132, four years after the UTPA had
added real estate transactions to its scope. Act of July 6, 1973, ch. 235, § 1, 1973 Or.
Laws 402.
10 6 OR. REv. STAT. § 90.135 (1993).
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and those with certain enumerated unfair provisions,"° for un-
lawful removalsos and entries,u 9 and for dwellings that pose an
imminent threat to health or safety. 10 The ORLTA remedies for
these practices sometimes go beyond those of the UTPA, but
in other cases they are weaker.1 12 There is no prohibition in the
ORLTA against fraud in general, such as a landlord misrepre-
senting to the tenant that the rental unit is well insulated and
quiet." 3 Arguably, such fraud is actionable under the UTPA as
conduct that is "not covered by ORS 90.100 to 90.940
[ORLTA], 114 and thus not excluded. Courts should so construe
the UTPA to provide a remedy for any landlord misconduct
otherwise a violation of the UTPA that is not remedied under the
ORLTA 15 The legislature should also strengthen those reme-
dies in the ORLTA that are weaker than those under the
UTPA1 16 to give consumer tenants as much protection as they
receive in their other transactions.
10 7 OR. REV. STAT. § 90.245 (1993).
108 OR. REV. STAT. § 90.375 (1993).
109 OR. REV. STAT. § 90.920(2) (1993).
11 0 OR. REV. STAT. § 90.380(5) (1993).
III Most notable is the tenant's right to recover actual damages and up to three
months' rent if the landlord attempts to enforce a provision prohibited under
§ 90.245.
112 For example, § 90.255 authorizes attorneys' fees to the prevailing party in
ORLTA actions. In contrast, the UTPA allows an award of fees to the prevailing
merchant only if the UTPA action was frivolous. See discussion infra part III.E.
The UTPA authorizes punitive damages, see discussion infra part III.C., but the
ORLTA does not. See Brewer v. Erwin, 287 Or. 435, 442, 600 P.2d 398, 403-04
(1979) (refusing to superimpose the remedy of punitive damages onto the noncom-
pensatory damage measures in the ORLTA).
113 Some provisions of the ORLTA address specific disclosure obligations. E.g.,
OR. REV. STAT. § 90.310 (1993) (disclosure of pendency of foreclosure proceeding
on rental unit).
1 14 OR. REV. STAT. § 646.605(7) (1993).
115 The Oregon Court of Appeals has adopted this approach in permitting a resi-
dential tenant to assert a UTPA counterclaim for false advertising against the land-
lord in a forcible entry and detainer action. See Hoffer v. Szumski, 129 Or. App. 7,
877 P.2d 128 (1994).
116 For example, § 90.255 of the ORLTA should be amended to allow the success-
ful landlord to recover attorneys' fees only if the tenant's claim is frivolous, at least
for such deceptive-trade-practice-like claims as unconscionability and breaches of
the landlord's statutory obligation of good faith in § 90.130.
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II
UTPA CONDrIONS FOR PRIVATE AcrIONS
A. Summary of Conditions
The UTPA private remedy for redressing practices declared
unlawful in section 646.608 imposes three primary conditions on
private relief: (1) the claimant must have suffered some "ascer-
tainable loss of money or property" as a result of the unlawful
practice, (2) the unlawful practice must have been committed
willfully, and (3) the UTPA action must be commenced within
the specified limitation period. This Article examines each of
these conditions to determine if they keep meritorious consumer
claims from being pursued or otherwise add unnecessary hurdles
to consumer redress of marketplace deception.
B. The Ascertainable Loss Condition
Derived from the 1970 UTPCPL," 7 Oregon's condition of an
"ascertainable loss of money or property" '118 is most relevant
when a claimant seeks the statutory minimum damage award of
$200.119 Many other states require "loss" as a condition to pri-
vate relief either expressly or impliedly by judicial construc-
tion.' 20 The loss condition is said "to guard against vicarious
suits by self-constituted private attorneys general when they spot
an apparently deceiving advertisement in the newspaper, on tele-
vision or in a store window." '121 Oregon's additional requirement
that a violation be willful, 22 however, assures that the merchant
held liable will have intentionally or negligently engaged in the
particular unlawful conduct. Thus, innocent advertising errors
will not expose merchants to opportunistic claimants seeking
statutory damages. If the loss condition is eliminated or changed,
the innocent merchant remains protected by the willful
117 See SUGGESTED STATE LEGISLATION, supra note 43, § 8, at 148-49.
1 1 8 OR. REV. STAT. § 646.638(1) (1993).
119 Oregon's allowance of statutory minimum damages is discussed infra part
III.B. The loss condition may also be relevant if the claimant seeks injunctive or
other equitable relief in lieu of damages, see PRIDGEN, supra note 2, § 5.04[1l, at 5-
20, or punitive damages.
120 Id.
121 Weigel v. Ron Tonkin Chevrolet Co., 298 Or. 127, 136 n.6, 690 P.2d 488, 494
n.6 (1984) (quoting David A. Rice, New Private Remedies for Consumers: The
Amendment of Chapter 93A, 54 MAss. L.Q. 307, 314 (1969)).
12 2 See discussion infra part II.C.
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condition.123
The expansion of the scope of Oregon's UTPA since its enact-
ment and the potential for future expansion compel reform of
the ascertainable loss condition. Oregon cases construing the
loss condition typically involve fraud in the sale of realty, goods,
or services. In those circumstances courts have excused proof of
any specific amount of loss, as long as some loss is "capable of
being discovered, observed or established."124 Even a nominal
loss will satisfy the loss condition. 125 These liberal cases, how-
ever, belie the serious limitation on private relief posed by the
123The effect of Oregon's dual conditions of loss and willfulness is illustrated by
the facts of Crooks v. Pay Less Drug Stores Northwest, Inc., 285 Or. 481, 592 P.2d
196 (1979). The defendant merchant intended to advertise razor cartridges at the
sale price of 89¢, but mistakenly advertised that price for the razor itself, normally
sold for $3.29. The plaintiff was allowed to purchase that razor at $2.89 but not for
89¢. He recovered the $200 minimum damages apparently based on his ascertain-
able loss of $2. The advertising mistake was not a blameless one. Apparently, the
merchant had detected the error but decided the cost of reprinting the newspaper
insert was prohibitive. The merchant instead published a correction in small print in
a different part of the same newspaper. The jury apparently concluded that the
merchant's deception was willful. One commentator concerned about the liability of
innocent advertisers under state deceptive practice statutes agrees with the outcome
in Crooks because the merchant "had reasonable opportunity to avoid the decep-
tion," albeit at great cost, but instead "permitted the dissemination of information
which it knew to be deceptive." See Sovern, supra note 23, at 464.
Query whether the merchant could have relied on the loss condition to elude lia-
bility by simply declining to sell the misadvertised razor to the customer at any price.
Oregon courts have not yet decided whether a frustration of a buyer's expectation
constitutes "loss." See Weigel, 298 Or. at 136-37, 690 P.2d at 495 (considering but
not deciding the issue). Those courts that have held the consumer's cost in traveling
to the store is a sufficient "loss" of money have effectively eliminated the loss condi-
tion. E.g., Rein v. Kons Ford, Inc., 567 A.2d 101, 108 (Md. Ct. App. 1989).
124 Scott v. Western Int'l Surplus Sales, Inc., 267 Or. 512, 515, 517 P.2d 661, 663
(1973) (footnote omitted) (ascertainable loss established where tent purchased did
not have a window with a closing flap as depicted on the wrapper); see also Weigel,
298 Or. at 137, 690 P.2d at 495 (testimony that used car represented as new was
worth less used than new supported award of statutory $200 damages); Martin v.
Cahill, 90 Or. App. 332, 752 P.2d 857 (1988) (evidence that city owned part of yard
represented as owned by seller supported finding of ascertainable loss); Tri-West
Constr. Co. v. Hernandez, 43 Or. App. 961, 972, 607 P.2d 1375, 1382 (1979) (loss
condition satisfied by evidence that homeowner would have had recourse to bond
for negligent construction had contractor been licensed as represented), review de-
nied, 288 Or. 677 (1980).
125 E.g., Crooks, 285 Or. at 487, 592 P.2d at 199 (difference between razor
purchase price of $2.89 and advertised price of 89v apparently justified $200 mini-
mum damages); cf. Riviera Motors, Inc. v. Higbee, 45 Or. App. 545, 609 P.2d 369
(declining to decide if $1.50 stop payment charge satisfies loss condition because
consumer incurred more substantial expenses in borrowing money to pay charges
for unauthorized car repair), review denied, 289 Or. 275 (1980).
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loss condition in circumstances not involving fraud. Both legisla-
tive amendment and Attorney General regulation have ex-
panded the UTPA beyond fraud to such unfair practices as
transmitting unwanted advertisements by fax,126 unwanted tele-
phone solicitations,127 and failing to provide certain disclosures in
health spa service contracts."2 These and other violations are
meaningless to private litigants if they must prove some loss of
"money or property" to obtain UTPA relief. Only a law profes-
sor's hypothetical could overcome the loss condition for such vio-
lations. The Attorney General does not need to prove an
ascertainable loss to seek injunctive or other relief. Oregon's
regulatory scheme therefore burdens the Attorney General with
enforcing these new UTPA requirements for which consumers
privately have no effective remedy. This allocation of enforce-
ment duty is clearly untenable with the prospect of decreasing
government resources.
Moreover, permitting private UTPA actions for unconsciona-
ble practices' 29 will be meaningless, in substantial measure, un-
less the loss condition is reformed. Although an unconscionably
excessive price would satisfy the loss requirement, unfair terms
not involving price, such as a waiver of some statutory protec-
tion, might be unconscionable but nonetheless fail to satisfy the
loss condition until actually enforced. 130
At least three possible reforms would address these concerns.
First, the loss condition could be abolished and the willful condi-
tion relied on to protect innocent merchants.13' But, this option
arguably goes too far because it may result in mass minimum
damages recovery against a merely negligent merchant.1 32 A
better approach would bifurcate the loss condition depending on
the remedy sought: a claimant seeking the UTPA $200 minimum
126 OR. REV. STAT. §§ 646.608(1)(ff), 646.872 (1993).
127 OR. REV. STAT. §§ 646.608(1)(hh), 646.563 (1993).
128 OR. REV. STAT. §§ 646.608(l)(y), 646.671 (1993).
129 This reform is advocated supra part I.B.
130 See Orlando v. Finance One of West Virginia, Inc., 369 S.E.2d 882 (W. Va.
1988) (class action consumers suffered no ascertainable loss as required by the West
Virginia Consumer Credit and Protection Act because lender had not attempted to
enforce unconscionable waiver of homestead exemption). Some unconscionable
waivers may not result in the requisite loss of money or property even if enforced.
131 See supra notes 122-23 and accompanying text.
132 The definition of willful includes conduct the person should have known was a
violation. OR. REV. STAT. § 646.605(10) (1993). Should these consumer watchdogs
bring a class action, however, minimum damages recovery would be unavailable.
See infra note 245 and accompanying text.
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damages or punitive damages would need to prove the requisite
"loss"; in contrast, a claimant seeking "equitable relief"133 should
not have to prove any loss. For example, a claimant could seek
to avoid enforcement of an unconscionable contract term with-
out proof of any loss. Private injunctive relief, which the UTPA
either permits or should be reformed to permit,134 also would be
available without proof of loss. Thus, the recipient of unwanted
advertisements by fax could seek to enjoin future transmissions.
This reform, however, might be insufficient to deter certain of
the newly added UTPA violations for which there is little individ-
ual incentive for claimants to seek equitable relief. For example,
a health spa that willfully fails to identify the person providing
the health spa services in its contract 35 would be deterred little
by the unlikely prospect of some consumer seeking private in-
junctive relief to halt that practice for the benefit of others. The
loss condition on damages would insulate against any damages
liability for that violation. The benefits of deterrence may justify
a third approach: replacing the "loss" condition with one of "in-
jury" to the consumer. Borrowed from Oregon's unlawful debt
collection practices act1 36 and other states' deceptive practice
acts, 37 the injury standard avoids requiring some loss of money.
Instead, claimants seeking the $200 minimum damages (or other
UTPA relief) need only show an "invasion of any legally pro-
tected interest. 1 38  The injury standard 139 as applied in other
133 OR. REV. STAT. § 646.638(1) (1993).
134 See discussion infra part III.F.
135 See OR. REv. STAT. § 646.671(1) (1993).
136 OR. REV. STAT. § 646.641(1) (1993) ("Any person injured as a result of willful
use or employment... of an unlawful collection practice may bring an action... to
recover actual damages or $200 .... ").
137 E.g., MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 93A, § 9 (Law. Co-op. 1994).
138 See Leardi v. Brown, 474 N.E.2d 1094, 1101 (Mass. 1985) (adopting Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts definition of "injury" for purposes of Massachusetts decep-
tive practice statute, which was amended in 1979 to replace an ascertainable loss
condition with one of injury). The tenants in Leardi whose lease contained an un-
lawful disclaimer of the habitability warranty were held to have suffered "injury"
even though the landlord had not attempted to enforce the disclaimer. Id.
139 The Oregon Court of Appeals has held that emotional upset is an "injury" for
purposes of Oregon's unlawful debt collection private action justifying the minimum
$200 recovery. See Creditors Protective Ass'n, Inc. v. Britt, 58 Or. App. 230, 648
P.2d 414 (1982). If Oregon adopts the "injury" standard for the UTPA, courts
should employ the Massachusetts standard of "invasion of any legally protected in-
terest" and allow recovery in appropriate circumstances without proof of specific
harm whether monetary or emotional. For example, a health spa customer who is
not given the health spa rules as required by statute may not have suffered monetary
[Vol. 73, 19941
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states nonetheless guards against purely "vicarious suits by self-
constituted private attorneys general" by demanding that there
be some relationship between the defendant and the injured
claimant." ° On balance, both bifurcation and the "injury"1 "4 re-
form are superior to retaining the "loss" condition or simply
abandoning any such requirement.
C. The Willfulness Condition
Oregon's private remedy applies only to "willful" 142 offenders
who "knew or should have known" their conduct violated the
UTPA.143 The willful condition, meant to protect the careful,
honest merchant, has been criticized for increasing the risk and
cost of deceptive practice litigation.1" One commentator has ob-
served, however, that as to conditions of merchant liability in
general, "[t]he best way to deal with rules which make it prohibi-
tively expensive for consumers with legitimate grievances to ob-
or even emotional harm, but may nonetheless have been injured under this liberal
standard and thereby recover UTPA minimum damages.14
°See Leardi, 474 N.E.2d at 1102 (quoting Rice, supra note 121, at 314). For
example, customers of a health spa that fails to provide the required UTPA disclo-
sures should satisfy the injury standard, but those who never contracted with the
health spa should not.
141 The Oregon Court of Appeals has held that the UTPA does not permit recov-
ery for personal injury. Gross-Haentjens v. Leckenby, 38 Or. App. 313, 589 P.2d
1209 (1979) (claimant sought recovery for injuries suffered in accident allegedly re-
sulting from dealer's misrepresentation of condition of brakes). This decision was
based on the language of the "loss" condition, and the outcome could be different
under an "injury" standard. The floodgates to the UTPA would not necessarily be
opened to personal injury lawyers desiring attorneys' fees recovery. Among other
things, the injured claimant would still need to prove that some willful unfair or
deceptive practice caused the injury. Moreover, individuals not acting in their "busi-
ness, vocation or occupation" are not liable under the UTPA. OR. REv. STAT.
§ 646.608(1) (1993). In any case, if the legislature does not want to allow physically
injured claimants access to the UTPA even in these limited circumstances, it could
expressly exclude personal injury claims when adopting the "injury" standard.
If the UTPA "loss" standard is retained, personal injuries caused by a UTPA vio-
lation should nonetheless be compensated under the UTPA if a claimant has in-
curred medical expenses and thus suffered the requisite loss of money. A federal
district court has interpreted the Leckenby holding to exclude personal injury claim-
ants from the UTPA even if they seek damages for medical expenses or property
damage. See Allen v. G.D. Searle & Co., 708 F. Supp. 1142, 1158 (D. Or. 1989).
This interpretation, however, goes against the plain language of the UTPA.142 OR. REv. STAT. § 646.638(1) (1993).
14 3 OR. REV. STAT. § 646.605(10) (1993).
144 E.g., Lee, supra note 44, at 155; cf. Thomas v. Sun Furniture & Appliance Co.,
399 N.E.2d 567, 570 (Ohio Ct. App. 1978) (To read Ohio statute to require proof of
intent "would effectively emasculate the act and contradict its fundamental
purpose.").
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tain redress is to increase the amounts awarded to prevailing
consumers, rather than penalize merchants who have done noth-
ing wrong." 145 Although the willful condition has been fatal to
Oregon claimants who failed to plead it,"4 Oregon juries and
judges appear likely to decide the question of willfulness in the
claimant's favor if the issue reaches them. 47 Given this experi-
ence, Oregon should retain the willful condition in its UTPA. 148
One reasonable reform Oregon might consider is bifurcating
the willful condition to make it apply only to actions seeking
damages recovery but not to those seeking equitable relief. Ore-
gon's Attorney General must prove willfulness only when seek-
ing a civil penalty against a violator, 49 not when seeking
injunctive relief or restitution for injured consumers. It seems
consistent with easing the burden on the Attorney General to
eliminate the willful condition for private litigants seeking equi-
table relief. 5°
D. The Statute of Limitation Condition
The UTPA imposes a one year statute of limitation on private
actions that commences upon the claimant's discovery of the vio-
lation.15' There is a two year limitation period, however, for the
145 Sovern, supra note 23, at 462.
146 Heierman v. Murray & Holt Motors, Inc., 44 Or. App. 341, 605 P.2d 1359
(1980) (granting motion for nonsuit because claimant neither pleaded nor intro-
duced any evidence of willfulness); Luedeman v. Tri-West Constr. Co., 39 Or. App.
401, 592 P.2d 281 (1979) (same problem).
147 E.g., Scott v. Western Int'l Surplus Sales, Inc., 267 Or. 512,517 P.2d 661 (1973)
(evidence sufficient to support judge's finding that merchant who had tent on dis-
play should have known the tent was misrepresented on its package); Martin v. Ca-
hill, 90 Or. App. 332, 752 P.2d 857 (1988) (sufficient evidence to support jury finding
of willful misrepresentation of property boundaries).
148 Should the legislature enact a private remedy for unconscionable practices, the
willfulness condition could be satisfied on proof the merchant knew or should have
known its conduct was unconscionable. The Uniform Consumer Sales Practices Act
provision on unconscionable practices employs the similar standard of whether the
supplier "knew or had reason to know" of various inequitable circumstances. UNI.
CONSUMER SALES PRAcnICEs Acr § 4, 7A U.LA. 241 (1971).
149 OR. REV. STAT. § 646.642(3) (1993).
150 Such bifurcation is consistent with one commentator's observation that the
greatest problem with deceptive practice statutes generally is their "use of strict lia-
bility for remedies other than injunctive and restitutionary relief." See Thomas J.
Holdych, Standards for Establishing Deceptive Conduct Under State Deceptive Trade
Practices Statutes that Impose Punitive Remedies, 73 OR. L. REV,. 235, 343 (1994).
151 OR. REV. STAT. § 646.638(5) (1993). See Bodin v. B. & L. Furniture Co., 42
Or. App. 731, 735-36, 601 P.2d 848, 850 (1979) (borrowing the objective standard
from Oregon fraud actions that discovery occurs when the claimant had sufficient
[Vol. 73, 1994]
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closest analogous action to the usual UTPA claim - fraud. 52
The Oregon Supreme Court in dictum explained the shorter
UTPA period as follows:
The evident purpose [of the UTPA] is to encourage private
actions when the financial injury is too small to justify the ex-
pense of an ordinary lawsuit, provided that the action is timely
initiated while the unlawful practice may be continuing and
that the state is given an opportunity to investigate the prac-
tice for possible wider enforcement action.153
The court also observed that the UTPA's private action was
taken "verbatim" from the 1970 UTPCPL, 54 but that Act did
not specify a statute of limitation. In fact, most states have ex-
pressly or impliedly adopted at least a two year period.155
Oregon should adopt a two year period for its UTPA, as there
is no good reason to employ a shorter period for these actions
than for the closely analogous fraud actions. The supreme
court's rationale supposes a consumer who would otherwise
sleep on her rights is prompted to quick action by knowledge of
the short limitation period. The Attorney General is then able to
move quickly to enjoin the offender from victimizing other con-
sumers. Of course, few claims proceed in this manner. Consum-
ers are likely unaware of the fast-track requirements of the
UTPA. They may also find it difficult to obtain a lawyer. Addi-
tionally, the Attorney General is not poised to investigate and
act upon each private action filed. The shorter period compared
to fraud and other common law actions instead strips consumers
knowledge to "excite attention and put a [reasonable] party upon his guard or call
for an inquiry"). The UTA does allow expired claims to be asserted as a counter-
claim. OR. REV. STAT. § 646.638(6) (1993). Although such a claimant probably can-
not receive a net positive damages recovery, attorneys' fees should be awarded to
the successful counterclaimant without regard to the amount of the merchant's
claim. See generally SHELDON & CARTER, supra note 12, § 7.3.4, at 381.
152 OR. REV. STAT. § 12.110(1) (1993). The limitation period for negligence ac-
tions is also two years, id., though the discovery rule does not apply to most negli-
gence claims. Oregon's new statutory regulation of the deceptive practices of
mortgage bankers and mortgage brokers also specifies a limitation period for private
actions that is more liberal than the UTPA. See OR. REV. STAT. § 59.925(4) (1993)
(such actions must be commenced within the later of three years after the transac-
tion or two years after discovery of the claim, but in the latter case no more than five
years after the transaction).
153 Weigel v. Ron Tonkin Chevrolet Co., 298 Or. 127, 135,690 P.2d 488,494 (1984)
(footnote omitted).
154 Id. at 135 n.5, 690 P.2d at 494 n.5.
155 For a state-by-state listing of deceptive practice limitation periods, see
PRIDGEN, Supra note 2, at App. 3A.
HeinOnline  -- 73 Or. L. Rev. 665 1994
OREGON LAW REVIEW
of meritorious statutory claims and compels them to navigate the
treacherous waters of the common law for actions brought more
than one year after their discovery of the deception.156 A na-
tional expert on deceptive practice litigation argues that those
few states with a one year limitation period frustrate the purpose
of deceptive trade practice statutes to give meaningful rights to
unsophisticated consumers.1 57 Oregon should remove its name
from that ignoble list.
III
OREGON UTPA PRIVATE ACTION REMEDIES
A. Guidelines for Reform
Modeled after the 1970 UTPCPL, the UTPA private remedy
attempts both to deter unscrupulous merchants and to provide
incentive to victims to initiate enforcement actions they would
not otherwise pursue.158 Its ability to serve these dual purposes
will become increasingly limited as the state's complementary en-
forcement role declines. That decline will expose old weaknesses
and create new ones in a private remedy essentially unchanged
156 An examination of Oregon case law reveals that most of the UTPA claims held
time-barred would have been timely under a two year limitation period. E.g., Saenz
v. Pittenger, 78 Or. App. 207, 715 P.2d 1126 (1986); Christofferson v. Church of
Scientology, 57 Or. App. 203, 644 P.2d 577, review denied, 293 Or. 456, 650 P.2d 928
(1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1206, 1227 (1983); Myers v. MHI Investments, Inc., 44
Or. App. 467, 606 P.2d 652 (1980). The only case to fall outside a two year period
involved unusual facts and was brought over three years after the claim accrued.
See Jaquith v. Ferris, 64 Or. App. 508, 669 P.2d 334 (1983), aff'd on other grounds,
297 Or. 783,687 P.2d 1083 (1984); cf. Donohoe v. Mid-Valley Glass Co., 84 Or. App.
584, 735 P.2d 11 (UTPA claim apparently would have been timely under a two year
period with a discovery rule), review denied, 303 Or. 534, 738 P.2d 977 (1987).
Moreover, the claim in the Oregon case that established the standard for the discov-
ery rule in UTPA actions would have been timely without regard to discovery under
a two year standard. Bodin v. B. & L. Furniture Co., 42 Or. App. 731, 601 P.2d 848
(1979).
157 See Jonathan Sheldon, UDAP Statutes That Work and Those That Do Not,
STATE LEGISLATIVE CONSUMER NEWS 6, 7 (Summer 1992).
158 See David A. Rice, Remedies, Enforcement Procedures and the Duality of Con-
sumer Transaction Problems, 48 B.U. L Rav. 559, 573 (1968). One commentator
explained the private remedies' deterrence role as filling the void left by public en-
forcement that "can monitor and detect only a small fraction [of marketplace
fraud].... In contrast, when consumers have an effective private remedy, the un-
scrupulous merchant is never certain who can safely be defrauded, and who will
respond with a lawsuit." Toward Greater Equality, supra note 90, at 1626 (footnotes
omitted).
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since its enactment in 1971.159 The next sections of this Article
examine each aspect of the private action remedies and propose
various reforms to better encourage meritorious claims and deter
unscrupulous merchants without unduly harassing the honest
ones. Because Measure 5 impacts the judicial system as well as
state agencies, reforms whenever possible should also encourage
the efficient and speedy resolution of UTPA claims.
B. The UTPA Minimum Damage Award
The UTPA private action provides a $200 award of minimum
damages when actual damages are less. 6° This award intends to
serve the same dual purposes of the private action in general: to
deter violations and to encourage victims to sue despite small
dollar losses.16' Adopted in 1971 from the 1970 UTPCPL, the
$200 award has remained unchanged. Adjusting the statutory
award for inflation from 1971 to 1994 requires at least a threefold
increase to approximately $720 to have the same impact it had
when enacted. 62 Several states that award minimum damages1 63
159 The standard for entitlement of successful defendants to attorneys' fees was
clarified in 1977 as discussed infra note 214 and accompanying text.
160 OR. REV. STAT. § 646.638(1) (1993). For example, a consumer forced to pay
$2.89 for a razor advertised falsely at 899 recovered the $200 minimum award.
Crooks v. Pay Less Drug Stores Northwest, Inc., 285 Or. 481, 592 P.2d 196 (1979).
161 Hearings on H.B. 2386 Before the Senate Judiciary Comm., 67th Sess. (June 8,
1993) (testimony of Professor Richard A. Slottee). House Bill 2386 is discussed in-
fra at notes 165-68 and accompanying text.162 The inflation adjustment was calculated by reference to the increase in the
U.S. consumer price index from 1971 to the fourth quarter of 1993 as published in
Table B-108 of the Economic Report of the President (1994). One commentator has
argued that the amount of the minimum recovery in state deceptive practice statutes
should be based on uncompensated costs that the UTPA claimant incurs such as lost
time. See Holdych, supra note 150, at 271 n.131. $720 is not unreasonable compen-
sation for such potential costs.
Apart from adjusting the UTPA damages award to account for inflation since its
enactment, Oregon's legislature should adopt an automatic adjustment mechanism
to allow for periodic adjustment of the statutory damages award without the need
for further legislation. Both the 1968 and 1974 Uniform Consumer Credit Codes
provide for adjustment of statutory dollar amounts each even-numbered year that
the percentage of change in the Consumer Price Index for Urban Wage Earners and
Clerical Workers, All Items, exceeds a specified amount. See UNIF. CONSUMER
CREDrr CODE § 1.106,7 U.L.A. 610 (1968); § 1.106, 7A U.L.A. 28 (1974). The "Ad-
ministrator" (in Oregon it would be the Attorney General) is required to announce
any periodic changes by rulemaking. Id. The federal Bankruptcy Reform Act of
1994 adopted a similar automatic adjustment procedure for bankruptcy exemptions.
See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, § 108.
163For a list of twenty-one states that award such damages, see SHELDON &
CARTER, supra note 12, § 8.2.3.1, at 422 n.87.
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have updated their awards recently to adjust for inflation over
the last few decades. For example, in 1990 Idaho raised its $500
award to $1000.1"4
Oregon is unquestionably overdue for an update to its UTPA
statutory damages award. Realizing this, the Debtor/Creditor
Section of the Oregon State Bar proposed House Bill 2386 in
1993 to increase the award prospectively to $500.165 Concerns
about the impact of such an increase on small claims court ac-
tions, however, led the Senate to abandon the reform./66 Testi-
mony before the Senate Judiciary Committee urged that
increasing the award to $500 would allow a defendant sued for
that amount in small claims court167 to assert its constitutional
right to trial by jury in actions exceeding $200,161 and thereby
remove the action to district court.1 69 In that event, the defend-
ant could employ legal counsel denied it in the small claims fo-
rum,170 and the claimant would presumably have to counter by
seeking counsel herself. These results were portrayed as unfair
to consumers.
This concern for small claims litigants is a red herring and,
moreover, easily remedied. What merchant would demand a
jury in light of juries' notorious sympathy for consumer claim-
ants? A merchant would wisely do so only if convinced the con-
sumer's claim is not merely untenable, but frivolous. In district
164 IDAHO CODE § 48-608 (Supp. 1994).165 A corresponding bill to increase the minimum award under the unlawful debt
collection practices act was introduced as Senate Bill 258.
166 House Bill 2386 was ultimately enacted with replacement language addressing
travel tour abuses. Act effective Nov. 4, 1993, Ch. 645, 1993 Or. Laws 1597. Senate
Bill 258 remained in committee upon adjournment. Legislation introduced in the
1995 Oregon legislature as Senate Bills 224 and 67 seeks again to raise the respective
UTPA and unlawful debt collection practice action minimum awards to $500.
167 Oregon small claims courts have exclusive jurisdiction over claims of $200 or
less, and concurrent jurisdiction with district (and justice) courts over claims from
$201 to $2500. See OR. REV. STAT. § 46.405 (1993). See generally James W. Nass &
Bradd A. Swank, Oregon State Courts: Practice and Rules, in 1 CIVIL LrnoATION
MANUAL ch. 1 (Oregon State Bar 1993).
168 OR. CONsT. art. VII, § 3. See generally Fredric R. Merrill, Equity Under the
ORCP, in OREOON EQUrrABLE REMEDIES ch. 2 (Oregon Law Institute Seminar
Materials, Mar. 11, 1988).
169 Hearings on H.B. 2386 Before the Senate Judiciary Comm., 67th Sess. (June 16,
1993) (testimony of Keith Burns). The defendant's right to remove a case from
small claims to district court upon demanding trial by jury is governed by OR. REV.
STAT. § 46.455 (1993).170 OR. REV. STAT. § 46.415(4) (1993) ("No attorney ... shall appear on behalf of
any party in litigation in the small claims department without the consent of the
judge of the court.").
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court, the merchant could defend against that frivolous claim
with counsel and recover attorneys' fees.171  Otherwise, the
merchant seeking a jury trial is being foolish. Once in district
court, the claimant is not limited to the recovery sought in the
small claims court action."7 2 Now in the hands of counsel, the
claimant might seek punitive damages 173 and can recover attor-
neys' fees if the UTPA claim succeeds." 4 Even if the merchant
prevails, it cannot recover its fees unless the action was frivolous.
Given these circumstances, it is difficult to imagine that busi-
nesses will want a jury. In fact, businesses increasingly employ
aggressive contractual devices such as arbitration 175 and waiver
clauses to keep consumer claimants away from sympathetic ju-
ries.176 Perhaps the legislature is concerned that no lawyers will
assume the consumer's claim under the UTPA, leaving the con-
sumer relocated in district court overmatched against the defend-
ant's attorney. If so, the UTPA must be further reformed to
encourage attorneys to pursue meritorious consumer claims with-
out hesitation.
At least two solutions resolve any concern that defendants
might opportunistically remove a case from small claims court if
the damages sought exceed $200.177 Any increase of minimum
damages could expressly apply only to actions brought outside of
small claims court.178 Alternatively, the $200 jury trial threshold,
increased by initiative in 1974 from $20 to $200,179 could be re-
171 See OR. REv. STAT. § 646.638(3) (1993) (discussed infra part III.E.).
1 7 2 OR. REv. STAT. § 46.455(2)(c) (1993).
173 See discussion infra part III.C.
174 See OR. REv. STAT. § 646.638(3) (discussed infra part III.D.).
175 See infra part III.H. (discussing arbitration clauses).
176 Cf. SHELDON & CARTER, supra note 12, § 7.10A, at 149 (Supp. 1993) (urging
as the first tip in effective consumer representation that a jury demand be made by
consumers because "juries are usually sympathetic to the consumer").
177 One commentator has observed that "[wjealthy defendants have learned that
merely demanding a jury as a strategic measure may deter less wealthy small claims
plaintiffs from proceeding with their claims." Margreth Barrett, The Constitutional
Right to Jury Trial. A Historical Exception for Small Monetary Claims, 39 HAs-
TINOS LJ. 125, 127 (1987) (footnote omitted). Her argument is better suited to
claims for which the successful consumer is unable to recover attorney fees.178 Professor Slottee testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee on House
Bill 2386 that most consumer claimants in small claims court are not even aware of
their UTPA remedies. Hearings on H.B. 2386 Before the Senate Judiciary Comm.,
67th Sess. (June 16, 1993) (testimony of Professor Richard A. Slottee). Instead, they
are pursuing an unarticulated claim in the nature of fraud or unconscionability. The
UTFA minimum damage award will therefore be utilized only in district court.179 See generally Don S. Willner, More Justice Under Law, 55 OR. L. REv. 183,
188 (1976). The $200 UTPA award was borrowed in 1971 from the 1970 UTPCPL
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formed again by initiative to allow larger claims of any nature to
be pursued in small claims court without the defendant being
able to compel trial by jury, and thus obtain removal of the case
from the small claims forum.
Apart from the need to increase the UTPA minimum damages,
Oregon should consider the fact that twenty-one states award a
doubling or trebling of the actual damages proven by the con-
sumer.18 One commentator recently urged that the ideal decep-
tive practice statute would combine minimum and multiple
damages and award the greater of minimum damages or treble
the actual damages proven.181 Treble damages are urged to in-
crease the merchant's incentive to settle the consumer's claim. 2
and has remained unchanged since then. In 1971, the jury trial removal threshold
was $20. Since 1974, the UTPA minimum damages and the jury trial threshold have
coincided in amount.
180 For a list, see SHELDON & CARTER, supra note 12, § 8.2.4.1, at 423 n.105.
Although treble damages are recoverable under the federal or Oregon "RICO," see
18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1988); OR. REV. STAT. § 166.720 (1993), few UTPA claims can
satisfy the narrow and rigorous standards for RICO liability. Cf Beckett v. Com-
puter Career Inst., Inc., 120 Or. App. 143, 852 P.2d 840 (1993) (affirming UTPA
judgment against vocational school that misrepresented its placement rate but grant-
ing motion to dismiss the students' Oregon RICO claim). Presently the subject of
hearings before the 1995 Oregon legislature, Senate Bill 386 would eliminate the
private Oregon RICO remedy.
181 See Sheldon, supra note 157, at 6. Senate Bill 224 introduced in the 1995 Ore-
gon legislature would employ this damage formula for UTPA actions. Although a
multiple damage remedy would take more consumer claims outside the $2500 ceiling
on the jurisdiction of small claims courts, see supra note 167, most consumers do not
seek UTPA remedies in small claims court. Instead they pursue unarticulated causes
of action in the nature of common law fraud or unconscionability for which multiple
damages would be unavailable. See discussion supra note 178.182 See SHELDON & CARTER, supra note 12, § 8.2.4.1, at 423. Massachusetts com-
bines minimum and multiple damages specifically to prompt settlement. See MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93A, § 9(3) (West 1994). The Massachusetts claimant must
make a written demand for relief before filing her claim. The merchant must then
tender a settlement that is "reasonable in relation to the injury actually suffered" by
the claimant or face the award of the greater of statutory minimum or multiple dam-
ages. Id. Conversely, the claimant who rejects a "reasonable" settlement offer is
limited to recovering the amount tendered in that offer. Id. One commentator has
argued the Massachusetts approach is unfair to businesses because, among other
things, a merchant who refuses to settle because it honestly disputes the claim is
penalized with multiple damages if the consumer eventually prevails. See Russell J.
Boehner, Note, Consumer Protection Statutes and the Common Law: Is the Imposi-
tion of Double or Treble Damage Awards "Unfair" to the Businessman?, 15 SUFFOLK
U. L. REV. 1157, 1181-82 (1981). In fact, the Massachusetts approach seems unfair
to consumers: dishonest merchants avoid further liability by tendering the claim-
ant's actual damages. This approach applied to the UTPA would allow dishonest
merchants to avoid punitive damage liability by paying the actual damages of just
those consumers who make a written demand for relief. This result is inadequate to
[Vol. 73, 1994]
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Though the threat of a mandatory trebling appears to be a valua-
ble aid in prompting settlement and encouraging private actions,
trebling is unnecessary for large dollar claims that already pro-
vide enough incentive. To avoid the trebling of Texas-sized dam-
ages,18 3 a cap on the amount of actual damages that can be
trebled (say, $3000) should be imposed.184
C. Punitive Damages Under the UTPA
Oregon is one of eight states whose deceptive practice statutes
expressly authorize punitive damages."8 5 Despite calls for puni-
tive damage recovery reform prompted by occasional notoriously
high awards, 8 6 punitive damages are crucial to the mission of the
UTPA. They deter wrongful conduct,'87 function as an "induce-
ment to bring actions that would not otherwise be pursued,"'"8
deter unscrupulous merchants. Moreover, adjudicating what constitutes a reason-
able offer is an unreasonable burden on the consumer litigant. Oregon should con-
sider adding treble damages recovery to the consumers' arsenal of UTPA weapons,
but should not employ the Massachusetts approach.
183 E.g., Birchfield v. Texarkana Memorial Hosp., 747 S.W.2d 361 (Tex. 1987) (re-
covery of $2,077,500 trebled). Texas has since amended its deceptive practice statute
to limit mandatory trebling to the first $1000 of damages; unlimited trebling is still
permitted for knowing violations. TEx. Bus. & CoM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(b)(1)
(West Supp. 1994).
184 In states that authorize doubling or trebling, courts have struggled to deter-
mine whether punitive damages can be recovered in addition to the statutory multi-
ple damage award. See generally PRIDGEN, supra note 2, § 6.05[41, at 6-28 to 6-29.
The difficulty is largely a matter of construing legislative intent, rather than an inher-
ent incompatibility of these two awards. The best approach would be for the legisla-
ture to mandate trebling, subject to a reasonable cap, combined with discretionary
but unlimited punitive damages.
185 OR. REV. STAT. § 646.638(1) (1993) (the "court or the jury ... may award
punitive damages"). See generally PRIDGEN, supra note 2, § 6.05[4], at 6-26 n.40.186 See generally Lynda A. Sloane, Note, The Split Award Statute: A Move Toward
Effectuating the True Purpose of Punitive Damages, 28 VAL. U. L. REv. 473, 485-90
(1993).
187 Andor v. United Air Lines, Inc., 303 Or. 505, 511, 739 P.2d 18, 22 (1987). In
the last few years, states have begun to enact special government penalties and pri-
vate damage awards against merchants who deceive elderly consumers. E.g., CAL-
CIV. CODE § 1780(b) (West Supp. 1994) (special award up to $5000). The potential
that juries will award substantial punitive damages under the UTPA against those
who exploit the elderly is sufficient deterrence without amending the UTPA to pro-
vide a special penalty in such circumstances.
188 Donald P. Hodel, The Doctrine of Exemplary Damages in Oregon, 44 OR. L.
REv. 175, 182 (1965). The possibility of an attorney fees award, discussed infra part
III.D., does not provide sufficient incentive for attorneys to pursue UTPA claims
that are meritorious but not a "sure thing." The prospect of recovering additional
fees through the punitive damage award may prompt lawyers to assume such UTPA
litigation. Oregon courts have recognized this function of punitive damages by con-
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and "provide strong inducement to settle UTPA private actions
prior to trial. ' 189 It is therefore essential that UTPA punitive
damages be held harmless from any potential legislative or judi-
cial attack that might be waged on punitive damages generally.
Honest merchants need not fear punitive damages; in addition
to the UTPA "willful" requirement for any private relief, Oregon
courts award punitive damages only when the common law's
stringent requirement is met. This standard, read into the UTPA
by courts, 19° awards punitive damages only for "wanton miscon-
duct" 191 that demonstrates a "high degree of social irresponsibil-
ity."' 92 Necessarily difficult to apply and still evolving, this
standard can best be understood through snapshot examples of
its application. Courts have determined, for example, that
merely negligent misrepresentation does not justify punitive
damages.193 Because such negligence is actionable under the
UTPA,1 94 punitive damages are therefore not automatically
available for every UTPA violation. Intentional fraud, on the
other hand, does justify punitive damages. 195 A reckless misrep-
resentation, in contrast, does not, absent "some showing of sys-
tematic or otherwise aggravated conduct evincing a high degree
of social irresponsibility." 196
struing the UTPA to allow a separate award of attorneys' fees even if the claimant's
lawyer has shared in a punitive damage award. See infra note 211.
189 See Conroy, supra note 24, at 507 (citation omitted).
19D See, e.g., Crooks v. Pay Less Drug Stores Northwest, Inc., 285 Or. 481, 490,
592 P.2d 196, 200 (1979).
191 See UNIFORM CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTION 75.02, in OREGON JURY INSTRUC-
TIONS FOR CIVIL CASES (Oregon State Bar 1993) thereinafter UNIFORM JURY
INSTRUCrION].192 Andor v. United Air Lines, Inc., 303 Or. 505, 516, 739 P.2d 18, 25 (1993).
193 E.g., Weigel v. Ron Tonkin Chevrolet Co., 298 Or. 127, 140, 690 P.2d 488, 496
(1984) (eliminating jury's award of punitive damages on possibility that jury based
award on merely negligent misrepresentation).
194 The UTPA private action remedies false or misleading representations that
satisfy the standard of willfulness; here whether the merchant knew or should have
known of the falsity. See OR. REv. STAT. § 646.605(10) (1993).
195 E.g., Haag v. Cembellin, 89 Or. App. 75, 748 P.2d 143 (1987) ($33,000 award
upheld where jury found fraud), review denied, 305 Or. 273,752 P.2d 1219 (1988). A
Court of Appeals decision rejected a car dealer's argument that allowing punitive
damages under the UTPA for consumer fraud violates the right to free expression
under the Oregon Constitution. Hinds v. Paul's Auto Werkstatt, Inc., 107 Or. App.
63, 67 n.5, 810 P.2d 874, 876 n.5, review denied, 311 Or. 643, 815 P.2d 1273 (1991).
1 96 Weigel, 298 Or. at 140,690 P.2d at 496. The common law has routinely denied
punitive damages recovery for unconscionable contracts. See generally Bender,
supra note 3, at 759-60 (observing courts have refused to award tort remedies such
as punitive damages unless the merchant's unfair conduct constitutes some estab-
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Until recently, Oregon juries were free to award any amount
they deemed appropriate if the threshold for punitive awards was
met. Oregon's constitutional restriction on post-verdict review of
punitive damage awards,1" however, was struck down on federal
due process grounds by the U.S. Supreme Court in Honda Motor
Co. v. Oberg,198 a products liability case in which the jury had
imposed a five million dollar award against the defendant ATV
manufacturer.
Oregon juries considering UTPA claims have been much more
subdued in their awards of punitive damages than their counter-
parts in certain products liability cases. Reported UTPA awards
range from a modest $500 to a generous but far from outrageous
$33,000.199 The existence of constitutionally mandated post-ver-
dict review of UTPA punitive damage awards in the wake of
Oberg should thus not pose any real concern to consumer liti-
lished tort such as fraud). Therefore, even if unconscionable practices are included
in the UTPA private remedy as urged in this Article, see supra part I.B., the com-
mon law standard read into the UTPA would likely deny punitive damages recovery
for unconscionability alone.
197 The Oregon Constitution has been construed to prohibit courts from reducing
the jury's award of punitive damages. See generally Miles A. Ward, Additur & Re-
mittitur, in 2 DAMAGES § 36.1, at 36-2 (Oregon State Bar 1990). The appellate
court, however, can eliminate the award entirely if the common law standard for
such recovery was not satisfied. Oregon presumably could also impose a statutory
cap on punitive damage recovery to prospectively control jury awards.
198 114 S. Ct. 2331 (1994).
199 See Wolverton v. Stanwood, 278 Or. 341,563 P.2d 1203 (1977) ($500); Allen v.
Morgan Drive Away, Inc., 273 Or. 614, 542 P.2d 896 (1975) ($2000); Sherrod v.
Holzshuh, 274 Or. 327, 546 P.2d 470 (1976) ($5000); Chamberlain v. Jim Fisher Mo-
tors, Inc., 282 Or. 229, 578 P.2d 1225 (1978) (error to award $5000 in punitive dam-
ages when common law standard not satisfied); Crooks v. Pay Less Drug Stores
Northwest, Inc., 285 Or. 481, 592 P.2d 196 (1979) (same result for $6000 award);
Weigel v. Ron Tonkin Chevrolet Co., 298 Or. 127, 690 P.2d 488 (1984) (same result
for $10,000 award); Martin v. Cahill, 90 Or. App. 332,752 P.2d 857 (1988) ($10,000);
Hall v. Fitzhugh, 80 Or. App. 423,722 P.2d 54 (1986) ($10,000); Riviera Motors, Inc.
v. Higbee, 45 Or. App. 545, 609 P.2d 369 ($10,000), review denied, 289 Or. 275
(1980); Mabin v. Thalatin Dev. Co., 48 Or. App. 271,616 P.2d 1196 (1980) ($12,500);
Dailey v. Sundance Ranches, Inc., 59 Or. App. 142, 650 P.2d 994 (1982) ($13,000),
review denied, 294 Or. 460, 658 P.2d 1162 (1983); Teague Motor Co. v. Rowton, 84
Or. App. 72, 733 P.2d 93 (1987) ($15,000); Honeywell v. Sterling Furniture Co., 310
Or. 206, 797 P.2d 1019 (1990) ($20,000 award overturned because of improper in-
structions informing jury of Oregon's statutory distribution procedure for punitive
damage awards (OR. REv. STAT. § 18.540)); Haag v. Cembellin, 89 Or. App. 75,748
P.2d 143 (1987) ($33,000), review denied, 305 Or. 273, 752 P.2d 1219 (1988).
Although these awards are relatively small, they are often large in relation to the
actual damages suffered. E.g., Riviera Motors, 45 Or. App. at 545, 609 P.2d at 369
($200 UTPA minimum damages, $10,000 punitive award). See generally Conroy,
supra note 24, at 507-08.
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gants.2°° Moreover, this history of modest awards to Oregon
consumer litigants should be cited to exempt UTPA claims from
any other attempts to rein in punitive damage awards.20
D. Attorneys' Fees to UTPA Claimants
The "American rule" followed by Oregon courts denies attor-
neys' fees to successful claimants unless authorized by statute or
contract2 '2 and thus stifles most common law fraud or negligence
claims of consumers. The UTPA encourages private enforce-
ment by authorizing attorneys' fees to successful claimants;2"3
these fee awards, however, are a matter for the court's
discretion.2"
If Oregon's private action is to shoulder a greater enforcement
2 0 0 In compelling post-verdict review of Oregon punitive damage awards, the
Supreme Court did not decide the standard of review that is constitutionally re-
quired. Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 114 S. Ct. 2331, 2341 n.10 (1994) (observing
there may not be much difference among the various standards employed in other
states such as "passion and prejudice" of the jury or "gross excessiveness" of the
award). On remand, the Oregon Supreme Court adopted the standard of whether
the award was "within the range that a rational juror would be entitled to award in
the light of the record as a whole." Oberg v. Honda Motor Co., 320 Or. 544, - P.2d
- (1995).
201 Efforts to limit punitive damages are being conducted in Congress, the Oregon
legislature, and the courts. Congress is considering legislation to limit punitive dam-
ages awards in product liability cases to the greater of three times the economic
injury or $250,000. H.R. 10, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 103(c)(2) (1995). The Oregon
legislature's Joint Subcommittee on Civil Process has scheduled a public hearing in
February 1995, to consider the abolition of punitive damages. Finally, the Supreme
Court has granted certiorari to review an Alabama case that held punitive damages
of two million dollars for consumer fraud was constitutionally reasonable. BMW of
North Am., Inc. v. Gore, 646 So. 2d 619 (Ala. 1994), cert. granted, 63 U.S.L.W. 3555
(U.S. Jan. 23, 1995) (No. 94-896). In a concurring opinion, an Alabama Supreme
Court justice noted that inflation-adjusted punitive damage awards from reported
cases in other jurisdictions for fraud in the sale of automobiles ranged from $12,000
to $196,000 with an average of approximately $71,000. 646 So. 2d at 630. Even
when adjusted for inflation, the Oregon UTPA awards listed supra at note 199 all
fall below this "national average."
2 02 See Mattiza v. Foster, 311 Or. 1, 4, 803 P.2d 723, 725 (1990). Part of the so-
called tort reform package, section 6 of Senate Bill 385 would award attorneys' fees
to the prevailing party in actions in contract or tort in which the plaintiff claims
$20,000 or less.
203 OR. REv. STAT. § 646.638(3) (1993) ("court may award ... reasonable attor-
ney fees at trial and on appeal...").
2 04 Id. Discretionary fee awards were proposed in the 1970 UTPCPL. SUG-
GESTED STATE LEGISLATION, supra note 44, § 8(d), at 149. Some states have im-
proved on this suggestion by making awards to successful consumers mandatory
rather than permissive. For a state-by-state listing of mandatory and permissive at-
torneys' fees provisions, see SHELDON & CARTER, supra note 12, at App. A.
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load, it is critical that the UTPA attorney fee award be made
mandatory. Oregon's Supreme Court has stated emphatically
that the "availability of basic compensation to counsel [through
an award of UTPA attorneys' fees] ... cannot be problematical if
consumers are going to be able to bring UTPA actions against
dishonest and unscrupulous merchants."" 5 Oregon's legislature
should take this cue and ensure that victorious claimants will be
awarded attorneys' fees.2° 6 Failing statutory reform, Oregon trial
courts should heed the Supreme Court's message and employ the
standard used in federal civil rights cases: discretionary fees
should be awarded as a matter of course to successful claimants
unless special circumstances make the award "unjust."20 7
Court discretion to determine the amount of the award is per-
haps more ominous to consumer lawyers than the discretion to
deny fees altogether. Consumer lawyers believe courts award in-
adequate fees to consumers because the underlying claims are
themselves often very small.2ce In fixing fee awards for claims
205 Honeywell v. Sterling Furniture Co., 310 Or. 206, 213, 797 P.2d 1019, 1023
(1990) (discussed infra note 211).
206 The most recent uniform statute to address consumer transactions, Article 2A
of the UCC, provides that consumer lessees who successfully claim their lease is
unconscionable "shall" be awarded reasonable attorneys' fees. U.C.C. § 2A-108(4)
(1990). Regrettably, Oregon did not adopt this subsection. See supra note 82 and
accompanying text. Senate Bill 224 introduced in the 1995 Oregon legislature would
amend the UTPA private remedy to award mandatory fees to the prevailing
consumer.
UTPA claimants might seek mandatory fees pursuant to the parties' contract.
Although consumer contracts do not often provide fees for the consumer, consum-
ers might invoke Oregon's reciprocal statutory allowance of fees. See OR. REV.
STAT. § 20.096(1) (1993) (prevailing party "shall" be awarded fees if contract grants
fees to either party). Unfortunately, this statute is apparently limited to actions to
enforce the contract and therefore might not apply to most UTPA claims. Compare
Bliss v. Anderson, 36 Or. App. 559, 562, 585 P.2d 29, 31 (1978) (§ 20.096 inapplica-
ble to misrepresentation claim) with Millard v. Smedes, 42 Or. App. 889, 892, 601
P.2d 908 (1979) (distinguishing Bliss to award fees for successful misrepresentation
claim when contract allowed fees for actions "in connection with" the contract and
where claimant affirmed contract in seeking money damages rather than rescission).
207 See Leaffer & Lipson, supra note 6, at 552 (urging courts to employ the liberal
civil rights standard in awarding fees to consumers under state deceptive trade prac-
tice statutes).
208 See, e.g., Conroy, supra note 24, at 502 (reporting that Oregon consumer law-
yers generally believe that insufficient fees awards explain in part why so few UTPA
actions are brought); see also Stewart Macaulay, Lawyers and Consumer Protection
Laws, 14 LAw & Soc'y 115,136 (1979); William C. Whitford, Structuring Consumer
Protection Legislation to Maximize Effectiveness, 1981 Wis. L. REv. 1018, 1030
("[Tlhere is a widespread belief among [consumer] attorneys that courts will not
really award attorney fees commensurate with the time and effort involved where
the amount in controversy is small.") (footnote omitted).
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generally, Oregon courts have identified the amount in contro-
versy as a relevant factor.2 9 Though many consumer protection
statutes specifically provide that the amount of the claimant's
damage recovery is not controlling in determining the claimant's
fee award,21° Oregon's UTPA does not. Oregon's underdevel-
oped case law governing fees for successful consumer claims in
conjunction with the lack of express guidance in the UTPA gives
little comfort to Oregon consumer attorneys.2 n The legislature
should use express language to make it clear that the amount of
damages recovered will not affect the calculation of attorney fees
under the UTPA.
E. Attorneys' Fees to UTPA Defendants
Adapted from the 1970 UTPCPL, the UTPA allowance of at-
torneys' fees originally authorized the court to award "in addi-
tion to the relief provided in this section, reasonable attorney
fees and costs. '212 This language might be read to entitle suc-
cessful defendants, as well as successful claimants, to attorney
209 See generally Thomas C. Sand & Julie R. Vacura, Costs and Attorney Fees, in 2
DAMAGES § 32.21, at 32-18 (Oregon State Bar 1990). Oregon's Court of Appeals
has noted, however, that although the amount of recovery is "germane" to the
award of fees, it is not an absolute limitation, as otherwise a defendant "by a vigor-
ous or obstreperous defense, could force abandonment of the claim or [obtain] an
attractive settlement simply because it would be uneconomic for the [plaintiff] to
continue the effort." Willamette Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Borg-Warner Acceptance
Corp., 75 Or. App. 154, 157, 706 P.2d 577, 579 (1985) (non-UTPA action to foreclose
lien), review denied, 300 Or. 477, 713 P.2d 1058 (1986).
210 E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-110g(d) (West 1992) (court may award
"costs and reasonable attorneys' fees based on the work reasonably performed by an
attorney and not on the amount of recovery"); S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-5-202(8) (Law.
Co-op. 1989); UNw. CONSUMER CREDrr CODE § 5.108(6), 7A U.L.A. 169 (1974).
211 The Oregon Supreme Court has construed the UTPA to reject a merchant's
argument that an award of punitive damages sufficient to compensate the claimant's
lawyer precludes a separate award of attorneys' fees under the UTPA. See Honey-
well v. Sterling Furniture Co., 310 Or. 206, 797 P.2d 1019 (1990). This result is cru-
cial because the opportunity to share in any UTPA punitive damage award and to
receive a separate UTPA fee award will subsidize those meritorious but unsuccessful
claims for which the consumer lawyer receives nothing; cf. Ekl v. Knecht, 585
N.E.2d 156, 165 (11. App. Ct. 1991) (construing Illinois' statute to reach a contrary
result, denying discretionary attorneys' fees when the punitive damage award amply
compensates the lawyer). Despite the favorable result in Honeywell, the court con-
sidered only the limited issue of whether the UTPA precludes an otherwise willing
court from awarding fees on top of a large punitive damages award. The court did
not consider whether it would be an abuse of the trial court's discretion to deny fees
in such circumstances. Such a denial of attorneys' fees would frustrate UTPA poli-
cies and should not be tolerated.212 See Mooney, supra note 14, at 128 n.63.
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fees. Twenty years ago, Professor Mooney urged against this
pro-defendant interpretation because it "would likely cause
many meritorious private suits never to be brought for fear of an
irrational outcome," thus frustrating the "important policy of en-
couraging substantial private policing of the Act."2 13  In 1977,
Oregon's legislature resolved the uncertainty by authorizing the
court to award fees to successful defendants only upon finding
the UTPA action was "frivolous."214
This frivolous standard has been questioned recently by con-
sumer advocates. Article 2A of the UCC employs a similar stan-
dard for consumer leases: fees are allowed for the successful
defense of "groundless" unconscionability claims.215 Several
commentators have condemned the UCC's "groundless" stan-
dard as dealing a "death blow" to consumer claims because con-
sumers fear that courts will retrospectively deem unsuccessful
claims groundless.216 The frivolous (or groundless) standard,
however, seems a fair compromise in the difficult balance of en-
couraging consumer enforcement while protecting honest
merchants from spurious claims.217 Oregon can retain its frivo-
lous standard 218 but should guard against any standard more
2 13 Id.; cf PRIDGEN, supra note 2, § 6.06[3][a], at 6-40 ("One wonders whether
many consumers will be brave enough to pursue their statutory rights in [those juris-
dictions that award fees to businesses that successfully defend a consumer claim]
214 OR. REV. STAT. § 646.638(3) (1993).
215 U.C.C. § 2A-108(4)(b) (1990). Oregon did not adopt the UCC attorneys' fee
provision. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
216 See Charles A. Heckman, Article 2A of the Uniform Commercial Code: Gov-
ernment of the Lessor, by the Lessor, and for the Lessor, 36 ST. Louis U. L.J. 309,
331 (1992); Donald B. King, Major Problems With Article 2A: Unfairness, "Cutting
Off" Consumer Defenses, Unfiled Interests, and Uneven Adoption, 43 MERCER L.
REV. 869, 873 (1992).
217 See Lovett, supra note 1, at 749 ("Such a combination of financial encourage-
ment and responsibility seems the most promising vehicle to protect both consumer
rights and business interests."); see also Holdych, supra note 150, at 306. Should
Oregon reform the UTPA to remove the rulemaking condition from its catchall,
some defendants may seek recovery under the frivolous standard to discourage at-
tempts at the creative extension of that catchall. Courts should award fees under
this standard sparingly, if at all, when the question resolved against the consumer is
whether certain merchant conduct otherwise proven to have occurred is unfair or
deceptive for purposes of the catchall.218 Too few Oregon cases have interpreted the UTPA frivolous standard to deter-
mine whether what appears reasonable in theory has been applied fairly in practice.
The cases include Estate of Smith v. Ware, 307 Or. 478, 769 P.2d 773 (1989) (fees to
UTPA defendant proper even though they were incurred in defense of both UTPA
claim and common law fraud) and Heierman v. Murray & Holt Motors, Inc., 44 Or.
App. 341, 605 P.2d 1359 (1980) (award of $450 fees to defendant where plaintiff
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favorable to defendants.219
neither alleged nor proved the defendant's misconduct was willful). Other Oregon
statutes employ the frivolous standard and might be looked to as persuasive author-
ity for UTPA purposes. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 20.098(2) (1993) (certain breach
of consumer warranty actions); OR. REV. STAT. § 128.155 (1993) (certain actions by
trust beneficiaries); OR. REV. STAT. § 260.225 (1993) (actions to compel election
statement); OR. REV. STAT. § 656.390 (1993) (review of workers' compensation
claims); OR. REV. STAT. § 659.160(7) (1993) (discrimination in higher education);
see also Creditors Protective Ass'n v. Britt, 58 Or. App. 230, 648 P.2d 414 (1982)
(applying the frivolous standard in § 646.641(2) of Oregon's Unlawful Debt Collec-
tion Practices Act).
219 Introduced in the 1991 session, House Bill 3279 would have made an award of
fees mandatory in favor of the prevailing party in any civil action. Section 22 of that
bill would have aided consumers by making an award to successful UTPA claimants
mandatory, but it would have endangered them by replacing the UTPA's frivolous
standard for prevailing defendants with a mandatory award for any successful de-
fense. The bill fortunately was still in the House Judiciary Committee upon adjourn-
ment. Section 96 of Senate Bill 385 introduced in the 1995 Oregon legislature would
amend the UTPA to authorize discretionary fees to both prevailing consumers and
prevailing merchants. Should the legislature adopt this approach, consumers should
urge courts to exercise their discretion to deny fees to merchants except when the
consumer's action was frivolous.
Consider what the result might be if a prevailing defendant argues for attorneys'
fees pursuant to the parties' contract. Some states, but not Oregon, have a statute
that expressly denies enforcement to the consumer's promise to pay the other
party's attorneys' fees. E.g., UNw'. CONSUMER CREDIT CODE § 2.507 (Alternative
A), 7A U.L.A. 94 (1974). Should the issue arise, Oregon courts should construe the
UTPA to exclusively govern the merchant's right to fees as a prevailing party. To
enforce a contractual boilerplate allowance of fees would frustrate the carefully bal-
anced policies in the UTPA's attorney's fees provision.
Defendants might also attempt to use Oregon's offer of judgment procedure to
undercut the UTPA's frivolous standard. Rule 54 of the Oregon Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure allows the defendant to serve the plaintiff with a pre-trial offer to allow judg-
ment against the defendant in a specified amount. If the plaintiff rejects the offer
but fails ultimately to obtain a more favorable judgment, the plaintiff "shall not re-
cover costs, disbursements, and attorney fees incurred after the date of the offer,"
and the defendant "shall" recover its "costs and disbursements" after the offer was
served. Among other changes, § 1 of Senate Bill 385 would amend Rule 54 to add
that the defendant in such circumstances may also recover its post-offer "reason-
able" attorney and expert witness fees. Consider the hypothetical situation under
existing law of a UTPA claimant who seeks the $200 minimum damages as well as
punitive damages. Should the defendant make an offer of judgment limited to $200
and the plaintiff prevail on her claim but fail to recover any punitive damages, the
offer of judgment procedure would nullify the consumer's victory. Rule 54 would
deny recovery of the consumer's attorney fees incurred after the offer even though
she otherwise prevailed in the UTPA action. Moreover, the defendant could re-
cover its post-offer costs and disbursements even though the UTPA claim was not
frivolous, but valid. Consider the additional hypothetical of a UTPA defendant who
offers judgment for nominal damages on a UTPA claim that is not ultimately
proven. This defendant could collect its post-offer costs and disbursements even if
the action, though unsuccessful, was not "frivolous." Because these results would
undercut the legislature's intent to award costs and fees to UTPA defendants for
[Vol. 73, 1994]
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A more recent Oregon statute, however, exposes a potential
problem with the UTPA frivolous standard which takes no ap-
parent account of the consumer's motives. Adopted in 1983 and
applicable to all civil actions, ORS 20.105 awards fees to any liti-
gant who successfully defends a meritless claim pursued in bad
faith or for some other improper purpose.2  This statute pro-
vides honest merchants with adequate protection against spuri-
ous claims, and the legislature can now repeal the more specific
UTPA award for frivolous claims. Moreover, it deals more fairly
with consumers who in good faith pursue a meritless UTPA claim
pro se. In that circumstance, section 20.105 would deny the suc-
cessful merchant its fees because the consumer acted in good
faith. Failing the repeal of the UTPA frivolous standard, courts
should exercise their discretion in awarding attorneys' fees under
the UTPA to "read in" a requirement that pro se claims be both
meritless and in bad faith to justify an award of fees to the suc-
cessful merchant.221
F. Injunctive Relief Under the UTPA to Private Claimants
Whether a UTPA private claimant can obtain injunctive relief
is an open question. The UTPA authorizes "such equitable relief
as [the court] deems necessary or proper."'222 At least one na-
tional commentator has interpreted this provision to allow in-
junctive relief.223 However, this language, derived from the 1970
frivolous actions only, courts should construe the UTPA to override and displace the
Rule 54 procedure.220 See Mattiza v. Foster, 311 Or. 1, 803 P.2d 723 (1990) (construing § 20.105 to
require both improper purpose and a meritless claim to justify fees).
221 This interpretation is consistent with the allowance of attorneys' fees to suc-
cessful defendants in § 2A-108(4)(b) of the UCC, which awards fees only if the con-
sumer lessee brought an unconscionability claim she "knew to be groundless."
Rule 17 of the Oregon Rules of Civil Procedure, which presumably would govern
a pro se pleading under the UTPA, employs a similar standard. Though that rule
has been construed to award attorneys' fees to sanction either a meritless claim or
one asserted for an improper purpose, merit is determined by "the best of the
knowledge, information and belier' of the pleader. Seely v. Hanson, 317 Or. 476,
480, 857 P.2d 121, 123-24 (1993) (quoting OR. R. Civ. P. 17). Thus, an unsophistica-
ted pro se claimant ignorant of the UTPA requirements, such as those of ascertain-
able loss and willfulness, might escape liability under Rule 17 for the opponent's
fees.
222 OR. REV. STAT. § 646.638(1) (1993).
273 See PRIDGEN, supra note 2, § 6.04[2], at 6-18 n.11 (listing Oregon as among the
states that authorize private injunctive actions for deceptive practices). The Oregon
Court of Appeals has stated in dictum that the UTPA "offers injunctive relief," but
perhaps the court was referring to public enforcement actions where that remedy is
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UTPCPL, is less clear when read in connection with other provi-
sions of the 1970 UTPCPL and subsequent Oregon history. The
1970 UTPCPL separately authorized "injunctive or other equita-
ble relief" for any private action. 24 This authorization, however,
was contained in a subsection otherwise addressing class action
relief which Oregon failed to adopt. Moreover, the substantially
similar private remedy in Oregon's Unlawful Debt Collection
Practices Act, adopted in 1977, expressly refers to injunctive re-
lief in addition to the separate UTPA reference to "such equita-
ble relief as [the court] deems necessary or proper. '
Despite this history, it is important that the UTPA be amended
or, failing that, construed to allow private injunctive relief. The
Attorney General is expressly authorized to seek injunctive re-
lief,226 and this authority is part of the necessary equipment pri-
vate attorneys general need to bear their expanding
responsibility for enforcement.
Two important issues arising from the experience of other ju-
risdictions should be considered in setting the standard for pri-
vate injunctive relief. First, other jurisdictions have struggled to
determine whether a claimant should be allowed injunctive relief
if the claimant is not likely to be duped again by the same prac-
tice.227 For example, a former vocational school student who dis-
covers the school is misrepresenting its placement efforts might
seek injunctive relief to benefit future students. It seems reason-
able to allow private attorneys general the same opportunity as
state attorneys general to secure injunctive relief to benefit
others.228
unquestionably available. See Creditors Protective Ass'n v. Britt, 58 Or. App. 230,
232, 648 P.2d 414, 415 (1982).
2 24 See SUGGESTED STATE LEGISLATION, supra note 44, § 8(b), at 149.2 25 See OR. REV. STAT. § 646.641(1) (1993).
2 26 OR. REV. STAT. §§ 646.632(1), 646.636 (1993). Many UTPA requirements are
particularly amenable to injunctive relief, such as the prohibition against unwanted
fax and telephone solicitations. OR. REV. STAT. § 646.608(1)(ff), (hh) (1993).
227 See generally PRIDGEN, supra note 2, § 6.04[2], at 6-18 to 6-20; SHELDON &
CARTER, supra note 12, § 8.4.3.2, at 440.
228 California law authorizes "any person acting for the interests of itself, its mem-
bers or the general public" to seek injunctive and other relief for unfair business
practices. CAL Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17204 (West Supp. 1995). California courts
have held both individuals and organizations have standing under this statute to
seek injunctive relief as private attorneys general for the benefit of the public. See
Consumers Union of U.S., Inc. v. Fisher Dev., Inc., 257 Cal. Rptr. 151 (Cal. Ct. App.
1989) (consumers group had standing under section 17204 to seek injunction on be-
half of general public against discriminatory practices in residential subdivision);
Hernandez v. Atlantic Fin. Co., 164 Cal. Rptr. 279 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980) (individual
[Vol, 7/3, 19941
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The second issue is whether the claimant seeking injunctive re-
lief must demonstrate that the unlawful practice is continuing.
An Oregon court considered but did not decide this issue for
purposes of public injunctive relief under the UTPA.229 Courts
in a few other jurisdictions (notably Washington state) have con-
strued their consumer statutes as demanding that private en-
forcement be "in the public interest" 30 and, therefore, that the
plaintiff demonstrate a pattern of misconduct and potential for
repetition. It is not unreasonable for courts to exercise their dis-
cretion to so limit private injunctive relief. These courts, how-
ever, have extended that condition to private damages recovery,
which is indefensible. Isolated and nonrecurring fraud is still
reprehensible and should not be immune from statutory attack.
Moreover, Washington's experience with its public interest re-
quirement compels that other states avoid it except perhaps in
awarding private injunctive relief. The requirement has spawned
extensive case law and added needless complexity, uncertainty,
and expense to Washington's private action.231
G. Class Actions for UTPA Relief
Consumer class actions have been described by advocates as
had standing under section 17204 to seek injunction on behalf of general public for
violation of California automobile sales finance act). Unlike class actions, there is
no requirement under section 17204 that the representative plaintiff prove she was
personally damaged by the conduct sought to be enjoined. Hernandez, 164 Cal.
Rptr. at 284. Senate Bill 383 introduced into the 1995 Oregon legislature would
authorize any Oregon resident to seek the same remedies that the Attorney General
may obtain. As applied to the UTPA, this bill would give standing to consumers to
seek injunctive relief, restitution for injured consumers, and civil penalties on behalf
of the state.
229 State ex rel. Johnson v. International Harvester Co., 25 Or. App. 9, 13, 548
P.2d 176, 178 (1976) (concurring opinion considered whether the state must show a
continuing practice to obtain UTPA injunctive relief, and concluded in some circum-
stances proof of a single unlawful act could justify such relief).
2 30 See generally PRIDOEN, supra note 2, § 5.03[1], at 5-11 to 5-15; SHELDON &
CARTER, supra note 12, § 7.5.3 at 387-91. Washington's jurisprudence is the most
prominent. Washington courts have based this "public interest" requirement on
statutory language that Washington's act "shall not be construed to prohibit acts or
practices... which are not injurious to the public interest." WASH. REv. CODE
ANN. § 19.86.920 (West 1989).
231 See generally SHELDON & CARTER, supra note 12, § 7.5.3.1, at 387-89. One
commentator has urged that courts adopt the "public interest" condition to private
relief because the FTCA so limits actions by the FTC. See Boehner, supra note 182,
at 1184. It is more prudent to allow state private actions to fill the enforcement gap
to remedy isolated misconduct that the FTC is not permitted to pursue. See Sovern,
supra note 23, at 460.
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an "especially appropriate remedy for consumers" 2  and by de-
tractors as "legalized blackmail. '2 3 3 Until 1973, Oregon denied
class actions seeking damage relief and refused to adopt the 1970
UTPCPL's authorization of such actions when it enacted the
UTPA.3 In 1973, however, Oregon authorized class actions for
damages.235 Consumer class actions could be the ideal enforce-
ment vehicle to balance the future deficit in public enforcement
of the UTPA. At least three limitations on such actions, how-
ever, will likely diminish their potential to deter and redress un-
scrupulous merchant conduct. These limitations are: (1) the
related commonality and predominance requirements, (2) Ore-
gon's unique claim form procedure, and (3) the restrictions on
class action recovery of UTPA minimum damages.
Rule 32 of the Oregon Rules of Civil Procedure (ORCP) re-
states the federal requirement of commonality of questions of
law or fact as a condition to class certification. 236 The commonal-
ity prerequisite and the related need for the predominance of
such common questions237 present a formidable obstacle to
UTPA class relief unless the claim involves standardized sales
presentation fraud or the like. 38 Despite their sometimes detri-
232 Laird C. Kirkpatrick, Consumer Class Litigation, 50 OR. L. REv. 21,21 (1970).
233 Jonathan M. Landers, Of Legalized Blackmail and Legalized Theft: Consumer
Class Actions and the Substance-Procedure Dilemma, 47 S. CAL. L. REv. 842, 843
(1974).
234 See SUGGESTED STATE LEGISLATION, supra note 43, § 8(b), at 149. See gener-
ally Mooney, supra note 14, at 129 n.67.
235 This authorization is now found at Rule 32 of the Oregon Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, replacing the 1973 authorization in OR. REv. STAT. §§ 13.210-.410. For a per-
suasive argument based on what is now ORCP 32(K) that class action relief is
available under the UTPA despite the reference in the UTPA private remedy to
"individual" actions, which the legislature apparently overlooked in authorizing
class action relief generally in 1973, see Mooney, supra note 14, at 129 n.67.
236 OR. R. Civ. P. 32(A)(2) (1993).
237 OR. R. Civ. P. 32(B)(3) (1993) (providing as a pertinent factor in determining
the fairness and efficiency of class action adjudication the extent to which "questions
of law or fact common to the members of the class predominate over any questions
affecting only individual members"). Predominance, however, is easier to satisfy for
UTPA claims than in common law fraud actions. See Leaffer & Lipson, supra note
6, at 550-51 (observing certain elements relied upon by defense counsel in defeating
predominance, such as intent and reliance, may be irrelevant in deceptive trade stat-
ute actions).238 See SHELD>ON & CARTER, supra note 12, § 8.3.4.2, at 434-36; Lovett, supra
note 1, at 745; cf. Coe v. National Safety Assocs., Inc., 137 F.R.D. 252 (N.D. Ill.
1991) (vacating order certifying class fraud action by investors in water filter sales
scheme because sales presentations varied even though allegedly based on a stan-
dard "script").
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mental impact on consumer class actions, the commonality and
predominance requirements are well suited to permit class ac-
tions when efficient and should be retained.
The second obstacle to UTPA class actions, Oregon's
mandatory claim form procedure, should be eliminated. This
procedure limits the defendant's damages liability to just those
class members who submit individual claim forms requesting re-
lief.239 Unique to Oregon,2 ° this procedure has been blamed for
the abandonment of meritorious class actions and for injustices
that result when wrongdoing defendants retrieve huge damage
awards that go unclaimed.2 "1 Both plaintiff lawyers and com-
mentators in Oregon have urged the repeal and replacement of
the claim form procedure with an escheat of unclaimed damages
to the state's Common School Fund.242 This proposal was re-
jected by the legislature, however, in 1991.3 A more modest
reform would give the court discretion to impose the claim form
procedure. For example, the court might do so when class mem-
bers can readily be located and individual damages are substan-
tial. The legislature in adopting the discretionary approach might
set clear guidelines to foster predictability and address the con-
cern that the claim form procedure deters the initiation of class
actions. An alternative reform is repeal of the claim form proce-
dure for consumer class actions, or, more specifically, for class
actions seeking damages under the UTPA. Unclaimed damages
in the latter case could escheat to the Consumer Protection and
Education Revolving Account. 24
The third obstacle, ORCP 32(K), precludes recovery of the
$200 minimum damages in UTPA class actions. Professor
Mooney explained that the objective of the minimum penalty to
encourage private actions is achieved sufficiently in class actions
239 OR. R. Civ. P. 32(F)(2) (1993).
240 See Philip Emerson, Oregon Class Actions: The Need for Reform, 27 WILLAM-
ETTE L. REV. 757,759 (1991) (noting no other state imposes a mandatory claim form
procedure). But cf IND. CODE ANN. § 24-5-0.5-4(b) (Bums 1991) (providing that
money recovered in a consumer class action that cannot "with due diligence" be
restored to the consumers within a year after the judgment shall be returned to the
defendant); WYo. STAT. § 40-12-108(b) (1977) (same provision).
241 Emerson, supra note 240, at 768-70.
242 See id.; Bob Zarnetske, Recent Development, Oregon Class Actions: The
Continuing Need for Legislative Reform, 72 OR. L. Rnv. 205, 217-28 (1993).
243 See Zarnetske, supra note 242, at 217 n.78.
2 44 OR. REV. STAT. § 180.095 (1993).
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without such an award.245 He observed that federal courts had
refused to certify class actions seeking to recover statutory dam-
ages under the federal Truth in Lending Act (TILA), thus con-
firming recovery minimums are "usually inappropriate in class
actions."24 6 TILA's technical requirements can be violated inno-
cently, and violations are thus proven easily. Attorneys there-
fore don't need much encouragement to bring TILA class
actions. Aggregated statutory damage liability might also be un-
fair when levied against a lender who violated TILA innocently.
Moreover, technical TILA violations propagated in the standard
loan disclosure form can involve thousands of claimants. 247 In
contrast, UTPA violators have acted willfully and are thus less
sympathetic defendants. UTPA violations usually involve issues
of credibility and few are proven as easily as those under TILA,
so that greater encouragement is needed of UTPA private ac-
tions. Moreover, in the mid-1970s Congress addressed the con-
cern of mass statutory damage recovery in TILA class actions by
authorizing such recovery subject to a reasonable cap.248 Oregon
might similarly amend the ORCP to authorize minimum dam-
ages recovery in UTPA class actions subject to a cap of
$25,O00.249
H. Arbitration of UTPA Claims
Arbitration has been hailed in recent decades by advocates as
the consumer's ally to provide a realistic consumer enforcement
mechanism.2  Recent widespread inclusion of arbitration
clauses by businesses in their consumer contracts, 251 however,
245 Mooney, supra note 14, at 129 n.67; see also UNIF. CONSUMER CREDrr CODE
§ 5.201 cmt. 2, 7A U.L.A. 183 (1974) (explaining that the UCCC denies recovery of
consumer penalties in class actions for the same reason).
2 46 Mooney, supra note 14, at 129 n.67.24 7 The most notorious case denying class certification under TILA involved a
class of 130,000 members each seeking the minimum TILA award of $100, a total of
$13,000,000, for an alleged technical violation. Ratner v. Chemical Bank N.Y. Thst
Co., 54 F.R.D. 412 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
248 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(2)(B) (1988) (making the penalty amount in class actions
discretionary and imposing a cap of the lesser of $500,000 or one per cent of the
creditor's net worth).2 4 9 Twenty-five thousand dollars is the maximum civil penalty the Attorney Gen-
eral can recover upon proof of each willful violation. See OR. REv. STAT.
§ 646.642(3) (1993).
2 50 See generally Willner, supra note 179, at 185.
251 See generally Michael Z. Green, Preempting Justice Through Binding Arbitra-
tion of Future Disputes: Mere Adhesion Contracts or a Trap for the Unwary Con-
sumer?, 5 Loy. CONSUMER L. REp. 112 (1993).
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has initiated a debate on whether arbitration hurts the consumer
more than it helps. The explanation for the emerging shift in
opinion is that arbitration improves on inadequate common law
consumer actions, but lags behind the remedial advances of such
statutory actions as the UTPA. For example, the right to recover
UTPA minimum damages in arbitration is uncertain,252 as is the
arbitrator's authority to award punitive damages for UTPA viola-
tions.253 Attorneys' fees might also be unavailable to the success-
ful claimant in UTPA arbitration. The UTPA's statutory
allowance of fees refers to an award by "the court" in an "action"
brought "under this section." 54 A Massachusetts court constru-
ing a substantially identical fee provision held it inapplicable in
deceptive practice arbitration.25 5 Because most consumers will
therefore be unable to obtain counsel, arbitration is less desirable
than small claims court where the consumer will not have to con-
front the defendant's counsel.
Arbitration's shortcomings to the UTPA claimant are not lim-
ited to remedial concerns. Arbitration can deny the consumer
the right to engage a jury in UTPA actions exceeding $200.256
Additionally, class action relief, more efficient in theory than ar-
bitration, may be unavailable in arbitration.2 57 Finally, the arbi-
tration process does not generate binding precedent which would
both provide standards to guide honest merchants and aid in the
speedy resolution of claims against dishonest ones.
Reform of the deleterious effects of arbitration on consumers,
252 See generally G. Richard Shell, The Power to Punish: Authority of Arbitrators
to Award Multiple Damages and Attorneys' Fees, 72 MASS. L. REv. 26 (1987) (argu-
ing that arbitrators should be allowed to award treble and other statutory damages
under state deceptive practices statutes).
253 See SHELDON & CARTER, supra note 12, § 8.2.5.1, at 428-30 (noting that courts
are split in cases thus far decided in contexts other than deceptive practices); Shell,
supra note 252. See generally Timothy E. Travers, Annotation, Arbitrator's Power to
Award Punitive Damages, 83 A.L.R.3d 1037 (1978).
254 OR. REV. STAT. § 646.638(3) (1993).
255 Schultz v. Subaru of Am., Inc., 553 N.E.2d 893 (Mass. 1990) (statute referring
to "any action commenced hereunder").
25 6 See generally SHELDON & CARTER, supra note 12, § 7.7.1, at 145 (Supp. 1993).
257 Compare Dickler v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc. 596 A.2d 860 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1991) (remanding for class certification proceedings in arbitration of claim under
arbitration agreement that is silent on whether it permits class actions) with Gain-
maro v. Thorp Consumer Discount Co., 828 F. Supp. 673,674 (D. Minn. 1993) (court
is powerless to compel arbitration on a class basis when the arbitration agreement
does not provide for a class action), appeal dismissed, 15 F.3d 93 (8th Cir. 1994).
Presumably under either approach class actions could be frustrated by expressly ne-
gating them in an arbitration agreement.
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however, is problematic. The Supreme Court has held that fed-
eral law governing transactions in interstate commerce (the Fed-
eral Arbitration Act)258 preempts state law that would deem
claims concerning such transactions inarbitrable.259 Even though
Oregon cannot render most UTPA claims inarbitrable, that
would not be the most prudent reform regardless of preemption.
Rather than deny arbitration of consumer claims, reform should
focus on providing the same remedial opportunities in arbitration
as are available in private judicial actions under the UTPA. 260
For example, Oregon's arbitration act"6 could be amended to
expressly authorize attorneys' fees in arbitration to the same ex-
tent that such fees would be available in a court proceeding. Al-
ternatively, the UTPA's allowance of fees could be amended to
reference arbitration actions.262
Certain disadvantages to binding arbitration, such as the denial
of a jury trial, necessarily result from the arbitration model and
are not amenable to reform. To assure these deprivations were
agreed to fairly, courts should apply unconscionability and re-
lated fairness and assent doctrines liberally to police the validity
of the consumer's agreement to arbitrate.263 The UTPA can aid
258 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1988).
259 See, e.g., Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984). In a recent case, the
Supreme Court rejected the urging of the respondent and of twenty states in a brief
amici curiae to overrule its holding in Southland. Allied-Bruce Terminix Co. v.
Dobson, 1995 WL 15045 (U.S. Jan. 18, 1995) (deciding to continue federal control
over arbitration in cases involving any degree of interstate commerce). See gener-
ally SHELDON & CARTER, supra note 12, § 7.7.3, at 400; Joanne M. D'Alcomo,
Note, Resolving the Conflict Between Arbitration Clauses and Claims Under Unfair
and Deceptive Practices Acts, 64 B.U. L. REV. 377, 396-99 (1984).
260 Mediation may offer an alternative to judicial resolution of disputes that
avoids the remedial drawbacks of binding arbitration. In 1994, Lane County began
to implement a mediation program for small claim cases using volunteer mediators.
A similar program might be considered for use in other counties or for UTPA claims
in other courts.
261 OR. REV. STAT. §§ 36.300-.365 (1993).
262 See Shell, supra note 252, at 37 (observing the better approach is to amend the
state's arbitration act as Texas has done because otherwise every statute awarding
fees to consumers must be amended individually).263 See generally Jonathan E. Breckenridge, Note, Bargaining Unfairness and
Agreements to Arbitrate: Judicial and Legislative Application of Contract Defenses to
Arbitration Agreements, 1991 ANN. SURV. Am. L. 925 (1993). The Federal Arbitra-
tion Act permits states to invalidate an arbitration clause "upon such grounds as
exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract." 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1988). In
Allied-Bruce Terminix Co. v. Dobson, 1995 WL 15045 (U.S. Jan. 18, 1995), the
Supreme Court interpreted this authority to mean that states cannot "decide a con-
tract is fair enough to enforce all its basic terms (price, service, credit), but not fair
enough to enforce its arbitration clause." Id. at *10. Therefore, to the extent possi-
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against imposing arbitration through overreaching by providing a
statutory remedy to challenge the conscionability of merchant
practices as advocated in this Article.2' Consumers might there-
fore challenge an agreement to arbitrate that denies them access
to UTPA protection as itself an unfair trade practice.265
IV
THE FUTURE OF OREGON'S ENFORCEMENT AND
DETERRENCE OF DECEPTIVE TRADE
PRACTICES
Twenty years ago, Professor Mooney urged an attack on ram-
pant market fraud by giving Oregon's Attorney General more
money to pursue public enforcement.' Measure 5 has since
devastated that design. The role of public enforcement under the
UTPA must therefore be restructured to make better use of de-
clining public resources. The following strategies would best
complement the increased role of private enforcement of market
fraud.
Whether or not the legislature removes the rulemaking condi-
tion from the UTPA catchall,267 the Attorney General should en-
gage more actively in rulemaking under the UTPA. If removed
as a condition to the catchall, rulemaking will ease the claimant's
task of proving that a particular offensive practice is unfair or
deceptive. It has also been argued persuasively that increasing
the specificity of legislation increases compliance. 2"
Significant enforcement resources should be employed to co-
ordinate and encourage private enforcement efforts. For exam-
ple, the DOJ could more actively educate the public on the
ble, consumer litigants should direct their arguments of unfairness to the consumer
contract as a whole.264 See supra part I.B.
265 Oregon should avoid the type of legislation being considered in Texas mandat-
ing that its deceptive practices act, which governs unconscionable practices, will not
invalidate an agreement to arbitrate. Texas H.B. 845, 73d Sess. (1993). That bill
appears to be industry's attempt to beat back legitimate Texas consumer challenges
with a political stick.266 See Mooney, supra note 14, at 160.
267 See supra part I.A.
268 See Whitford, supra note 208 at 1019-25; see also Stewart Macaulay, Bambi
Meets Godzilla: Reflections on Contracts Scholarship and Teaching vs. State Unfair
and Deceptive Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Statutes, 26 Hous. L. REV.
575, 590 (1989) ("[lIf I were representing a client, I would be happy to discover the
more specific provisions of [certain states' deceptive practice statutes] .. ").
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private remedies available to combat consumer fraud. It could
also urge legislative reform to encourage private enforcement.
When enforcing the UTPA, the DOJ should concentrate on
the most serious continuing offenders269 who are eluding or are
undeterred by private enforcement. When possible, the DOJ
should act in concert with other state attorneys general to impose
the enforcement energies and penalties of several states on the
offending business. The wrongdoer who might otherwise manip-
ulate the various statutory or judicial loopholes in a single state's
law is less able to prevail on technical grounds and more likely to
settle quickly when enforcement energies are channeled simulta-
neously through the least problematic and toughest state law.
This public "class action" approach to enforcement may be the
most efficient way for a state like Oregon to spend its limited
public enforcement dollars. 70
Finally, Professor Mooney's proposal to add a criminal sanc-
tion to the Attorney General's enforcement arsenal271 should be
reconsidered for its potential to deter market wrongdoers. 72
The UTPA authorizes the Attorney General to seek a civil pen-
alty against willful violators,273 but this penalty has little influ-
ence on defendants who are insolvent or able to conceal their
assets.274 Oregon law imposes criminal sanctions for a few spe-
cific trade practices such as violations of gasoline price display
and credit card solicitation requirements.2 5 Oregon's new regu-
269 In 1975, Professor Mooney criticized the Attorney General for pursuing en-
forcement actions that arguably were not in the "public interest." See Mooney,
supra note 14, at 156.
270 One might anticipate "free rider" problems as states may choose to reserve
their resources if others are actively pursuing some national fraud. In practice,
states might be encouraged to join the group enforcement efforts to share in the
benefits of a monetary award or settlement. The FTC as a federal enforcement ve-
hicle for national fraud avoids any such "free rider" problem, but the FTC has re-
sources too limited to combat national fraud effectively without help. See supra
note 29.
271 See Mooney, supra note 14, at 125-27.
272 See Smith, supra note 17, at 427 (quoting Neil Goldschmidt who, as a Portland
legal aid attorney in 1969, remarked that criminal penalties would have a "strong
deterrent effect" on consumer fraud).
273 OR. REv. STAT. § 646.642(3) (1993) (penalty in court's discretion not to ex-
ceed $25,000 "per violation").
274 See Mooney, supra note 14, at 127.
275 See OR. REv. STAT. § 646.990 (1993). At the federal level, the mail fraud of-
fense is employed routinely to combat garden variety consumer fraud. E.g., United
States v. DeFusco, 930 F.2d 413 (5th Cir.) (five year sentence for fraudulent contest
scheme promoter who sent letters to millions of consumers falsely promising cars,
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lation of the deceptive practices of mortgage bankers and mort-
gage brokers carries the penalty of a Class C felony.276 Oregon
should consider sanctioning willful consumer fraud under the
UTPA by imposing the same penalty.
CONCLUSION
There are two risks in advocating reform of the UTPA to aid
its private enforcement. First is the risk that pursuing such re-
form could backfire if, once the debate on consumer protection
has been initiated, the legislature is persuaded to curtail rather
than to enhance the private remedy.277 Second is the risk that
reform will go too far and overshoot the desired balance of en-
couraging legitimate claims without harassing honest busi-
nesses.27 The moderate reforms proposed in this Article seek to
avoid the greater risk that without legislative action Oregon con-
sumers will become the unintended victims of Measure 5.
gold, furs, and cash to those who visited a time-share development), cert. denied, 112
S. Ct. 239 (1991).276 OR. Ie~v. STAT. § 59.992(1) (1993).
277 See Shapiro, supra note 44, at 494 n.289.
278 Ile Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act is the subject of much commentary
accusing the Texas legislature of having crossed the line between protection and
harassment to the detriment of honest businesses. E.g., John R. Harrison, Jr., Com-
ment, The Deceptive Trade Practices - Consumer Protection Act: The Shield Be-
comes a Sword, 17 ST. MARY'S LJ. 879 (1986).
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